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In an exploration of the joint concerns of economic development, namely eciency
and equality, I employ experimental methods to consider several issues regarding
entrepreneurship and regulation with particular applications in developing countries.
Entrepreneurship programs in developing countries may not take hold in rural
populations if people there tend to shy away from competitive and uncertain economic
opportunities, thus contributing to the systematic underdevelopment of rural areas.
In a eld experiment conducted among potential entrepreneurs in rural and urban
Ghana, we found that rural subjects were 20 percent less likely than their urban
counterparts to select an all-or-nothing tournament compensation scheme over a piece
rate wage to per- form a simple matching task. The dierence between the rural and
urban tournament choice was driven by subjects who believed their own performance
was the best within their group; urban subjects were twice as likely as their rural
counterparts to believe that they had scored in rst place and were thus more likely
to select the tournament compensation.
To examine behavior in a tax setting, we develop a simple tax evasion model as
a signaling game between a taxpayer and an auditor that includes a non-strategic,
always compliant taxpayer. In addition to the taxpayer's income report to the auditor,
he has the option to send a costly message, a donation to charity that may serve as
an indirect signal to the auditor of the taxpayer's ethical type. In the case where
the taxpayer has misreported his income and is audited, he must pay unpaid taxes
and a penalty. We establish a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium where taxpayers will use
the charitable donation to signal honesty, thereby reducing the probability of audit.
Auditors will optimally audit reports without charity donations more frequently than
those with donations. To test our theoretical predictions, we use a two-sided signaling
experiment where the taxpayer voluntarily reports his income to determine his tax
liability and can make an observable and veriable charity donation. Our aggregate
experimental results indicate players employ mixed strategies in line with theoretical
predictions.




Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulllment




Professor Maureen Cropper, Co-Chair/Advisor
Professor Erkut Ozbay, Co-Chair/Advisor







I would like to thank, rst and foremost, my advisors Professors Maureen Cropper
and Erkut Ozbay for their tremendous support and for accommodating my some-
what unconventional path over the course of my years in graduate school. Also, I am
grateful to the University of Maryland Department of Economics for providing the
nancial support for my experiments in Ghana and in the Experimental Economics
Lab at Maryland. A special thanks to Professor Raymond Guiteras for facilitating
the semester I spent in Ghana and to Kelly Bidwell and the Innovations for Poverty
Action sta in Accra for generously allowing me to make use of their oce and other
resources. Thanks to my creative consultant, Louise Johnsson-Zea for tremendous de-
sign and implementation work and to Peter Awin for invaluable insights that helped
me successfully run my experiments in Ghana. My appreciation goes to all of the
Ghanaians who welcomed me in their country and helped with my research, particu-
larly my recruiters in Osino who prevented a stampede. Finally, many thanks to my
family, friends and graduate student colleagues.
ii
Table of Contents
List of Tables v
List of Figures vii
1 Private Sector Lead Growth: Entrepreneurship, Institutions and Development 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Entrepreneurship in Developing Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Regulation, Incentives and Private Sector Growth . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 Competition in the City: Experimental Evidence from Rural and Urban Ghana 7
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 Field Settings and Subject Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3 Do Taxpayers Use Charity Donations to Keep Auditors at Bay? Theory and
Experiment 39
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2 Experimental Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.4 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5.1 Aggregate Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5.2 Behavior of Taxpayers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.5.3 Behavior of Auditors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
iii
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
A Preferences for Competition in Ghana: Experiment Instructions 80
B Tax Evasion and Charity: Experiment Instructions 83
B.1 Treatment 1 Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
B.2 Treatment 2 Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Bibliography 91
List of Tables
2.1 Subject Composition and Self-Reported Demographic Information . . 19
2.2 Summary Data (In number of correctly matched items, unless other-
wise indicated) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 Performance in Task 1 and Task 2 by Choice of Piece Rate or Tourna-
ment
(Choice Round, Task 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4 Composition of T3 Tournament Entrants by Change in Performance
from T1 to T2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5 Self Rank and Tournament Performance by Quartile (In Percent) . . 27
2.6 Self Rank by Rural and Urban in Tournament (T2) and Piece Rate
(T1) (In Percent) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.7 Probit of Tournament-Entry Decision: Dependent Variable Tourna-
ment Entry (Treatment 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.8 Probit Output, Decision to Submit the Piece Rate to Tournament, T4 33
2.9 Ex Ante Monetary Costs of Over- and Under-Entry . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.1 Experimental Parameters (in dollars) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2 Taxpayer Payos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.3 Auditor Payos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.4 Aggregate High Income Taxpayer Reported Income and Donation Rates
by Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.5 Aggregate Audit Rates Conditional on Viewed Income Report and Do-
nation by Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.6 Aggregate Low Income Taxpayer Reported Income and Donation Rates
by Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.7 Eective Treatment 2 Audit Rates Faced by Taxpayers Given Com-
puter Generated Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.8 Summary of Individual Taxpayer Decisions (number of subjects) . . . 72
3.9 Determinants of Taxpayer Donation, Probit Analysis by Treatment . 73
3.10 Summary of Individual Auditor Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.11 Probit: Independent Variable Audit (Marginal Eects) . . . . . . . . 76
A.1 Subject Datasheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
v
B.1 PAYOFF TABLES, Group A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
B.2 PAYOFF TABLES, Group B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
B.3 PAYOFF TABLES, Group A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
B.4 PAYOFF TABLES, Group B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
List of Figures
2.1 Rural Percentage of Population, 1950-2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Cumulative Density Function, Tasks 1 and 2 by Rural and Urban . . 22
2.3 Piece Rate and Tournament Performance by Experimental Subject . 23
2.4 Tournament Entry and Absolute Change in Performance . . . . . . . 25
2.5 Task 2 Self Rank and Choice to Compete in Task 3 . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.6 Task 1 Self Rank and Choice to Compete in Task 4 . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.7 Proportion of Total Population Choosing Tournament in Task 3 (4) by
Self Rank Task 2 (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1 Tax Compliance Game with Charity Donation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2 CDF of Individual Taxpayer Strategiesα0(a) and α1(b) in Treatments
1 and 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3 Average Percentage of Misreported High Incomes by Round and Treat-
ment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.4 Average Donation Percentage
Conditional on Misreporting High Income Types by Round and Treat-
ment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5 CDF of Individual Auditor Strategiesβ0(a) and β1(b) in Treatments 1
and 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.6 Treatment 2 CDF Audit Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.7 Audit Rate: Low Income Reports without Donations by Round and
Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.8 Audit Rate: Low Income Reports with Donations by Round and Treat-
ment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.9 Individual Taxpayer Behavior, Treatment 1 (A), Treatment 2 (B) . . 71
vii
Chapter 1
Private Sector Lead Growth: Entrepreneurship, Institutions and Development
1.1 Introduction
In recent years, development agencies and governments alike agree that building a
strong local private sector should gure prominently as a sustainable means to achieve
a number of development goals. The recent and largely unexpected telecommunica-
tions boom in Africa provides a striking example of the vast untapped economic
potential on the continent. Beyond the governments' initial allocation of the spec-
trum, the industry's growth was marked by the emergence of large-scale indigenous
entrepreneurs that had not been seen before in Africa [Makura, 2008]. The size and
scope of the telecommunication industry's development in Africa has extended be-
yond enriching the initial investors and entrepreneurs; improved communication has
beneted all groups in society, with improvements in the transmission of economic
information to communication technology's role in holding leaders accountable.
If entrepreneurs constitute the group best suited to identify under-served or sup-
pressed markets and to introduce new technologies to serve them, the need to better
understand the institutional and behavioral catalysts of entrepreneurship generates
a rich and important set of research questions with signicant implications on devel-
oping country economics.
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In the development context, the private sector's unmatched ability to drive im-
proved market eciency, must be paired with distribution mechanisms that are able
to achieve the ultimate development goal, poverty reduction.
In an exploration of the joint concerns of economic development of eciency and
equality, in this chapter, I consider several issues covered in the literature regarding
entrepreneurs in developing countries and some of the challenges they face due to
burdensome regulation, nancial and other institutional constraints. The following
chapters both employ experimental methods to conduct a focused analysis of some
issues that are relevant in the developing country context. The experiments pro-
vide a useful methodology for measuring preferences that are otherwise dicult to
quantify with standard empirical data sources such as surveys or macro data in a con-
trolled setting. Further whereas in Chapter 2 where no clear theoretical predictions
are forthcoming, in Chapter 3, I consider the alternative case, where we establish a
very clear theoretical benchmark which can be tested in a laboratory setting. Fi-
nally, experiments oer clean comparisons to similar studies. In Chapter 2, which
is based on joint work with Erkut Ozbay, I explore a potential behavioral barrier to
entrepreneurship, lack of competitiveness, by comparing the preferences over compet-
itive compensation schemes in urban and rural Ghana. Chapter 3, also based on joint
work with Ozbay, take a more general approach to an issue that aects the primary
redistribution mechanism across economies: taxation. In a general laboratory study
of tax evasion, we tested whether charitable donations have any eect on the truthful
reporting of income by experimental subjects and whether this behavior is predicted
by the theory.
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1.2 Entrepreneurship in Developing Countries
Informal self-employment activities in developing countries constitute the primary
source of income for many, where the economies are characterized by limited formal
sector employment opportunities, underdeveloped nancial services, weak legal sys-
tems and host of other institutional shortcomings. Formalization of the businesses
that operate outside of the ocial system has been suggested [De Soto, 2000] as an
important catalyst for economic growth and recent policy eorts to register informal
businesses reect the widespread acceptance of this notion. Informal businesses com-
prise a large part of economic activity and engage high proportions of the labor force
in many countries, therefore the anticipated benets of formalization make under-
standing the obstacles faced by informal rms in their path to the formal sector an
important policy consideration.
In a recent study using rm-level data for the informal sectors in Ivory Coast,
Madagascar and Mauritius [Amin, 2010], the motivation of the rm owner, that is
whether he was an entrepreneur out of necessity or opportunity, had a signicant
impact on his perceived severity of the obstacles to formalization, such as registration
fees, taxes and the eort required to gather information. Though many owners of
informal businesses are innovators who exploit new opportunities, tting the Schum-
peterian denition of an entrepreneur, others run their business out of necessity due
to lack of alternative employment. Of the 300 rms surveyed, 42 percent were char-
acterized as being run by a necessity entrepreneur.
Firm-level data from emerging economies has enabled research that explores the
characteristics of rms and obstacles that have not been available for systematic anal-
ysis in the past. However, data limitations have prevented researchers from gaining a
more objective understanding of the barriers to formalization. Experimental methods
applied in laboratory and eld settings can be used to identify what might be driving
3
the dierence in the perception of obstacles.
If there are systematic dierences in perceptions of economic obstacles between
entrepreneurs motivated by necessity and opportunity, perhaps there are other im-
portant dierences with serious implications for development. An auxiliary question
arises: is it better for society to have necessity or opportunity entrepreneurs? Do the
traits cultivated through necessity entrepreneurship develop commitment, hard work
and cooperation or do they lead to a more survivalist self-interested view of the world
that hinders their willingness to contribute to public goods?
In a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the role of entrepreneur-
ship in development, Naudé [2008] nds that government policies designed to fos-
ter entrepreneurship have ambiguous eects on growth, dependent upon the type
of new venture being promoted and the local entrepreneur's ability to implement
innovative and productive new businesses. One contribution of this research is to-
ward establishing further exploring the necessity v. opportunity distinction and any
behavioral regularities among these groups that may foster the development of ef-
fective entrepreneurship policies, particularly in regards to formalization. While the
entrepreneur as the jack-of-all trades [Lazear, 2005] may be an accurate characteriza-
tion in a developed country, in a developing country educational ability may provide
a better measure of entrepreneurial skill as the nature of the business opportunities
are dierent. Robson et al (2009) nd that the education level of small and medium
scale entrepreneurs in Ghana is positively correlated with the innovativeness of their
business.
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1.3 Regulation, Incentives and Private Sector Growth
The empirical link between excessive regulation and low quality institutional mea-
sures such as rule of law, control of corruption and enforceability of contracts is well
established in the literature. Djankov et al. [2002] nd strong empirical support for
the public choice view of regulation: they nd that regulation serves to entrench mar-
ket power of incumbents and to allow politicians to extract rents as opposed to the
public interest view where regulation leads to improved product quality and protec-
tion from market failures. High levels of regulation are correlated with the presence of
unocial economies and high levels of corruption, meanwhile the quality of goods is
not superior to that of low regulation countries. However, in a cross-country empirical
study, [Klapper et al., 2006] nd that regulation is a barrier to entrepreneurial entry
in rich, low-corruption rather than poor, high-corruption countries; that is, the causal
eects of regulation on entry seem to be limited to wealthy countries without corrup-
tion. In transition economies, if not more important than ocial regulation is how
regulation is actually implemented, which is closely tied to measures of institutional
quality [Johnson et al., 1998].
The opportunities for new market development and large prots are the most
abundant in the developing world. Whether regulation is a barrier to entry for pio-
neer entrepreneurs, those who are introducing a new product into the local market,
is therefore an interesting question from a development perspective. Given the incon-
clusive empirical ndings regarding the causal eects of regulation on new rm entry
in developing countries, a theoretical approach is justied to establish an alternative
hypothesis regarding the primary determinants of entrepreneurial entry.1
Baumol [1990] was the rst to introduce the dimension of entrepreneurial eort
1Other well established determinants of entrepreneurial entry include access to nancing, labor
market regulation and taxation.
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allocation. Further, he asserted that the types of activities that entrepreneurs engage
in may be productive, unproductive or destructive depending on the institutional
quality of the economy. Hillman et al. [2001] establish the equilibrium allocation of
resources between cost reduction and lobbying in an oligopolistic industry and nd
the results are sensitive to the relative lobbying abilities of rms.
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Chapter 2
Competition in the City: Experimental Evidence from Rural and Urban Ghana
2.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurs have long played a major role in economic systems and relatively re-
cently in the developing world, policy makers have turned to entrepreneurs to spur
the high growth necessary to signicantly improve living standards [see e.g. IFC,
2008; Petrin, 1994]. The focus on entrepreneurship as a path to economic growth
may further contribute to the urban development bias, where rural areas have consis-
tently fallen short of development gains in urban areas, if rural people are less likely
to become entrepreneurs.
The persistence of rural poverty in many developing countries underlies the basic
thesis of the urban bias theory put forth by Michael Lipton [1977], which asserts that
disproportionate concentration of political and economic power in urban areas favors
development policies that benet urban areas at the expense of rural ones. This
tendency leads to low public investment, unfavorable terms of trade and exchange
rate policies and systematically lower (and inecient) development outcomes in rural
areas.
Whether the urban bias hypothesis is the mechanism that explains the rural-
urban development gap is still a subject of debate [Varshney, 1993, Corbridge and
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Jones, 2005], but the existence of the rural-urban gap is not. Though recent stud-
ies have shown no global trends in the narrowing or widening of the rural-urban
gap [Eastwood and Lipton, 2000] and that empirical evidence of over-urbanization
and excessive competition for resources in urban areas indicates a complex, country-
specic macroeconomic relationship between urbanization and economic development
[Bradshaw, 1987].
Many agree that Sub-Saharan Africa suered acutely from urban bias and a large
rural-urban welfare gap through the 80's [Corbridge and Jones, 2005]. Structural
adjustments in the 1990's narrowed the rural-urban gap as public spending cuts were
made, but the ruralurban welfare gap remains high across a number of dimensions
[Sahn and Stifel, 2004], growing urban poverty levels notwithstanding.
After having held three peaceful democratic elections, Ghana, with a population
of just under 25 million [World Bank, 2009], is one of West Africa's stable democracies
and by all accounts, development indicators have shown improvement over the past
decade. Flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) have been growing steadily from
$150 million in 2005 to $435 million in 2006 and $435 million in the rst quarter of
2008 alone [UNCTAD, 2009]. With the rapid acceleration of FDI ows in Ghana, local
entrepreneurs will play an important role in terms of absorptive capacity [Cohen
and Levinthal, 1990], that is the ability to incorporate and adapt new technology that
accompanies the FDI.
The steady development in Ghana has been accompanied by urbanization rates
characteristic of the region, roughly doubling to 46.3 percent [UNEP, 2009] in the
past 50 years. The country's declining rural share of the population is in line with
the trend in other developing countries and Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 2.1). The
rural-urban welfare gap in Ghana is driven primarily by the rural lack of access to
commercial activity and basic services. Estimates from 1990's data show that the
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Figure 2.1: Rural Percentage of Population, 1950-2010
rural-urban consumption gap is around 40 percent. Across other welfare measures
such as health, education and access to sanitation, the persistent development gap in
Ghana is not generally worsening, but does not show signs of closing [Boakye-Yiadom,
2004, Sahn and Stifel, 2004].
Even with the steady decline in the rural population share and increased urban
migration, it is customary in West Africa, Ghana as well, for urban people to have
very close ties to their rural villages sending remittances and making frequent visits
[Aldous, 1962, Geschiere and Gugler, 1998]. Far from disconnected, as is more the
case in the rural-urban dynamics in developed countries, the two groups have fre-
quent contact, which makes the interpretation of our observed behavioral dierences
between urban and rural subjects that much more striking.
In examining the dierences in preferences over compensation schemes in a eld
experiment, we are capturing a new dimension of the rural-urban disparity beyond
the typical development indicators. Whether the city engenders behavioral changes
or attracts those individuals who possess certain preferences, understanding the ad-
justment in norms regarding preferences for competition in economic settings will be
of critical importance to employers and policy makers. With the experimental results
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we may be able to examine some endogenous determinants of the urban bias.
Despite the increasing urbanization of West Africa in recent decades, much of
the eld work in Africa continues to concentrate on rural village communities. Our
research generates a rich experimental data set for an under-researched, but very
important and growing demographic group of urban Africans. The results will moti-
vate further study into the causes, costs and benets of preferences for competition
and address broad questions regarding the interrelationship between urbanization and
economic development in Africa.
We used experimental techniques to assess whether rural and urban populations
in Ghana exhibit distinct preferences to engage in a risky, performance-based tourna-
ment in order to identify any dierences between the groups in some important traits
typically associated with entrepreneurs.
Our experimental data show that when presented with the choice between per-
forming a simple task, 1) for a piece rate wage or 2) in an all-or-nothing tournament,
only 30 percent of the subjects sampled from representative rural and urban areas in
the North and South of Ghana chose to enter the tournament. The tournament entry
percentage was substantially lower than that of similar experiments conducted both
in industrialized countries [Gupta et al., 2005, Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007] and in
traditional cultures in developing countries [Gneezy et al., 2009]. We also identied a
large dierence in the tournament entry decision between rural and urban subjects:
urban subjects were 20 percent more likely to choose the tournament than their ru-
ral counterparts. We attribute the overall low tournament entry primarily to rural
subjects lower condence in terms of relative performance.
Given our motivation, which is to see whether competitive preferences dier by ru-
ral and urban areas with implications on entrepreneurship and the development of new
business ventures, our experimental design has rural(urban) people competing other
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rural(urban) people. The within group competition is justied as the entrepreneurs
would be competing locally. This design feature contrasts with the gender and com-
petition studies [Gneezy et al., 2009, Gupta et al., 2005, Niederle and Vesterlund,
2007], where the two groups of interest, men and women, compete within experimen-
tal sessions. The motivation of the gender studies in explaining gender dierences in
competitive preferences in the workplace supports the mixed gender sessions, where
the interaction between the genders is important in establishing the external validity
of the experiment.
In simulating the entrepreneurial environment with an artefactual experiment,
we present the experimental subjects with a new, unfamiliar and relatively abstract
task, in the sense that the task is being completed for its own sake with no real life
implications. However, the abstract environment may be particularly relevant given
that entrepreneurship frequently involves untested ideas where people may have little
experience. The ability to identify and exploit opportunities and to perform amidst
risk and uncertainty are personal attributes frequently associated with entrepreneurs.
The simple experiments, described in detail in Section 3, were conducted in two
cities, Accra and Tamale and two towns, Nynkapala and Osino in Ghana to establish
a baseline understanding for preferences for competition. In Section 4, we discuss
the developing country eld setting and identify demographic characteristics of the
subjects. Section 5 provides an analysis of our key ndings regarding the determinants
of competitive behavior and some of the associated costs. Section 6 concludes with
a discussion regarding the implications of our ndings on development and proposals
for follow-up experiments to answer any questions that arise from the analysis in
Section 5. The following section provides a summary of related work.
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2.2 Related Literature
Recent experimental research has used tournament choice to illustrate dierences
in preferences over competitive situations across cultures, genders and occupations
[Gneezy et al., 2009, Gupta et al., 2005, Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, Carpenter
and Seki, 2005]. While the experiments elicit preferences over competitive compen-
sation schemes, they also measure attitudes toward condence, risk, uncertainty and
performance under pressure. The ability to identify and exploit opportunities and
to perform amidst risk and uncertainty are personal attributes frequently associated
with entrepreneurs in the economics and psychology literature [Kihlstrom and Laont,
1979].1
Bewley [1989] shows a theoretical link between low uncertainty aversion and busi-
ness innovation in entrepreneurship. In a study of Indian small and medium scale
entrepreneurs, Natarajan [2005] nds that tolerance for competition is a key char-
acteristic of all of those surveyed. Though certain characteristics of entrepreneurs
may not be robust to cultural comparisons as Thomas and Mueller [2000] demon-
strate empirically, they do nd that within a given culture certain characteristics can
distinguish the set of entrepreneurs from the rest of the population.
Little theoretical or empirical work has focused explicitly on the characteristics
of developing country entrepreneurs [Le, 1979, Naude, 2008] who face very dier-
ent regulatory and credit constraints than their developed country counterparts and
who may potentially dierent attitudes toward innovation, competition and risk. For
example, Blanchower and Oswald [1993] nd a signicant empirical positive link
1 Busenitz [1999] hypothesizes that entrepreneurs are not less risk averse than the general pop-
ulation but their reliance on heuristics and biases may make them appear to be more likely to take
on risk than others.
12
between a lack of capital constraints and a person's status as an entrepreneur; no
such link is found with their measure of psychological characteristics. However, the
context is clearly for that of employed, developed country individuals, with primary
motivations for becoming an entrepreneur being freedom and exibility. It is clear
that in a given developing country, more will need to be understood regarding the mo-
tivations of local entrepreneurs before we can establish which results from developed
countries are relevant in the developing country context.
In a meta-analysis of entrepreneurship selection, Van der Sluis et al. [2005] nd the
eect of education on worker choice between self-employment and wage employment
stronger in urban areas, the least developed economies and those that are heavily
dependent on agriculture, much like Ghana. In a comprehensive study of Ghanaian
entrepreneurs, Robson et al. [2009] nd that small and medium scale entrepreneurs
tend toward incremental product development, not large innovation and that the inno-
vativeness of entrepreneurial activities is positively correlated with the entrepreneur's
education level. These ndings motivated our subject selection which is discussed in
detail in Section 4.
2.3 Experimental Design
The experimental design enabled us to measure preferences for competition while
controlling for performance, condence and ambiguity aversion similar to Gupta,
Poulsen and Villeval [2005] and Niederle and Vesterlund [2007]. We use a novel task,
which will enable us to measure the preferences for competition in this developing
country context.
Subjects performed a simple task under a piece rate payment scheme, followed
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by a tournament round. Subjects were then asked to choose between the piece rate
and the tournament pay before to be applied to the third round of play. No specic
skills or training would have favored anyone beyond the general ability to identify
and match. However, successful performance required a combination of ability and
eort.
Identication and Matching Task
We designed a task and an environment that would be appropriate for local subjects
and that would facilitate accurate monitoring. In each city, we constructed 8 work
stations to ensure privacy for each subject to simultaneously complete the task. Be-
cause the task was not computerized, we were concerned with achieving uniformity
between subjects. To minimize variation due to monitoring, the same researcher and
a local assistant each monitored 4 subjects.
Upon arrival, we informed the subjects that each subject would receive a 2 cedis
show-up fee and an additional 3 cedis for completing the experiment. After a brief
explanation of the experimental procedure, subjects read and signed consent forms
followed by a brief demonstration. They were informed that they would perform the
task 4 times and would be given specic instructions immediately prior to playing.2
We also told them that one of the tasks would be selected at random to determine
their payo to ensure maximum eort in all tasks. At the conclusion of each round,
subjects were shown only their own performance at the conclusion of each task. They
did not know aggregate result.
At his private workstation, each subject was provided with a 1 quart basket con-
taining an identical mixture of familiar objects. Each basket contained 14 uniquely
2Subjects actually performed the identication and matching task 3 times, but we did not inform
them of this at the outset.
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identiable objects,3 where each unique object was in the mixture at least once (e.g.
magnet) up to 35 times (e.g. pasta), making the total number of objects in each
basket approximately 200. At the beginning of each task round, each subject was
provided with an identical picture of 21 of the objects in the basket placed in a num-
bered linear order.4 Subjects were then given 60 seconds to place the items from their
basket in the order indicated by the picture. At the end of 60 seconds, time was called
and all subjects were required to stand in a holding area while the monitors scored
and cleared each workstation. Scores were calculated based on number of objects
correctly placed according to the numbered sequence in the picture, measuring both
speed and accuracy. Just prior to each task, the specic compensation scheme was
explained in detail, both in English and in a local language, where necessary.5
Task 1, Piece Rate: Subjects were given 60 seconds to match as many items in
their basket to the corresponding numbered sequence distributed at the beginning of
the round. If the task was randomly selected, the subject received 50 peswas per item
correctly matched.6
Task 2, Tournament : Subjects were randomly assigned to groups of 4. Subjects
were not told who was in their group, but they were be able to see all of the possible
subjects who could possibly be included in their group. Subjects were then informed
that in the tournament round, payment would based on relative performance within
the randomly assigned group of 4. The highest performing subject in the group
3The objects varied in all dimensions, though most were some form of dried food: Bean (3
types), Dried Okra, Eraser, Magnet, Nail, Paper Clip, Pasta (3 types), Plastic Disc, Tamarind Pod
and Toothpick. Object composition varied between Accra and Tamale as all objects were purchased
locally. The dierences between the Accra and Tamale basket composition were minor and cannot
account for any Accra-Tamale dierences in performance.
4The number 21 was chosen optimally, after initial testing of the task by the researchers and
assistant, to be the lowest number of objects that would guarantee all subjects score below the
bound in the 60 second time limit, with some added contingency.
5Instructions are available upon request.
6The Ghanaian currency is the cedi, 1.3 cedis = 1 USD. The smallest unit of the currency is the
peswa, 100 peswas = 1 cedi.
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would receive 2 cedis per correct answer and the others would receive zero. In the
case of a tie, the winner was chosen at random from the high scorers. If each of the
4 competitors has a 25 percent chance of winning, then the tournament payo is the
same as the piece rate payo, in expectation.
Task 3, Payment Choice 1 : Subjects were asked before performing the task for
a third time, the choice of payment scheme to be applied to the third round perfor-
mance. They were given the choice between piece rate or tournament pay. For the
tournament choice, individual performance in round 3 was compared to tournament
performance in Task 2. That is to say, individuals who chose the tournament would
not be competing directly with one another in Task 3, but with the outcomes of
Task 2. This was to ensure that the subject's choice to enter the tournament was an
individual choice that did not depend on others choice of tournament entry.
Task 4, Payment Choice 2 : Upon completion of Task 3, subjects were asked
whether they would like to be paid a piece rate or tournament wage for Task 1 perfor-
mance. By giving the subjects the option to submit their past piece rate performance
to the tournament, we have separated the choice of entering into the competition
from the desire to actually perform in a competitive setting.
Beliefs-Assessment Finally, we asked each subject how they believe they ranked,
from 1 (best) to 4 (worst) in Tasks 1 and 2, out of the group of 4 from the Task 2,
tournament round. Subjects were paid 50 peswas per correct identication of rank.
The responses to the questions regarding relative performance enabled us to gage
condence and how it relates to the decision to compete.
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2.4 Field Settings and Subject Selection
The importance of eld experiments for questions regarding preferences for compe-
tition should be clear given the strong cultural components that surround the way
people compete in the marketplace. Because of the high inequality in Ghana, we risk
too many confounding factors from education to income to levels of outside exposure
would preclude our ability to attribute observed behavioral dierences between sub-
jects to urban or rural. As a result, we selected subjects with relatively similar
demographic characteristics such as age, education and income across the rural and
urban areas. Because of the critical importance of development through the formal
sector, the subject pool in our experiments was limited to current and potential for-
mal sector workers; all subjects were literate and had experience with modernized
non-physical labor either through secondary school or their current occupation. In
addition, the working-class segment of the population, from which we drew our sub-
jects, comprises a large group of unemployed and underemployed citizens whose labor
prospects are closely connected to Ghana's development goals.
To identify and recruit the targeted subject pool, we hired recruiters in each
experimental loaction. The recruiters were local residents who worked with foreign-
based NGO's and who had experience recruiting community members for similar
incentivized activities. The subjects that were selected, by and large, knew each
other with the exception of Accra, where subjects were not familiar with one another.
The eld experiments were conducted in four locations in rural and urban munici-
palities in the north and south. Ghana, like many of the countries in West Africa, has
a clear social and cultural distinction between the coastal, predominantly Christian
south and the Sahelian predominantly Muslim North.7 To ensure that our experi-
7There are 10 regions in Ghana: Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Central, Eastern, Greater Accra, North-
ern, Upper East, Upper West, Volta and Western.
17
mental subjects adequately represented the North-South divide and some of the other
regional divisions, we conducted the urban experiments in the southern coastal capital
city, Accra and the northern city of Tamale and the rural experiments in the southern
town of Osino and a town outside of Tamale, Nyankapala.8 Accra and the inland city
of Kumasi are the two largest cities in Ghana with 1.7 and 1.2 million inhabitants.
Tamale is distant third with 0.2 million inhabitants. We weighted the sample size
from each region in order to reect the actual population distribution.9 We were able
to determine the subject's home region from the short questionnaire administered
after all experimental tasks were completed. Also, as our design is geared toward
addressing entrepreneurship issues, it was important to have a representative cross
section of the Ghanaian population to add to the generalizability of our conclusions.
Subject selection was motivated by actual labor force composition so as to draw
inferences on the current and future labor force characteristics from our experimental
results (Table 2.1). Our recruiting eorts targeted educated members of the for-
mal sector work force and potential formal sector workers given our motivation of
transformative entrepreneurship and the positive empirical link between innovative-
ness and education found in Ghanaian entrepreneurs [Robson et al., 2009]. With the
help of our local assistants, we recruited subjects at post-secondary schools and area
businesses.
The mean age of the subjects was 24. Rural subjects were slightly younger (23) on
average than urban (25) subjects. All of the subjects were educated with 90 percent
8While nearly all of the subjects in the Accra experiments hailed from the Greater Accra Region,
the Tamale subjects were from the Northern Region, including the capital city of Tamale, Upper
East and Upper West.
9Approximately 70 percent of the population lives in the regions constituting the South, in-
cluding the capital city of Accra and the Ashanti capital Kumasi.
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Table 2.1: Subject Composition and Self-Reported Demographic Information
Pooled Urban Rural
Total Subjects 101 53 48
South (Accra, Osino) 69 37 32
North (Tamale, Nyankapala) 32 16 16
Percent Women 32 34 29
Mean Age 24 25 23
(5.3) (5.3) (5.2)
Mean Number of Languages Spoken 3.2 3.4 3.0
(1.2) (1.1) (1.3)
The ratio of Southern to Northern subjects 2:1 was chosen to roughly represent
the regional population distribution of the country.
Income is in Ghana cedis. At the time of the experiment, the exchange rate was
approximately 1.4 Ghana cedi to 1 USD.
Standard deviation in parentheses.
having completed secondary school many with further training, from technical school
to university studies. The subjects also had signicant exposure to various ethnicities
other than their own with the self reported average number of languages spoken of
just over 3.
Average subject income was 60 cedis so the payo range of 5 to 48 represented
signicant stakes for a 30 minute work session. According to 2006 data, median
formal sector wages in Ghana range from 21 USD per month in agriculture to 121
USD per month for civil servants. The median income for formal sector jobs is 41
USD per month [Nsowah-Nuamah et al., 2010]. All instructions were given in English,
Ghana's ocial language, with some clarications given by our local assistants in the
local language.
Of the 101 subjects, 32 percent were women. Because we were not focusing on
gender issues we did not select equal distribution of men and women but a represen-
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tative sample of the pool of potential and current workers. The gender balance of our
subjects reected the actual formal sector labor force participation by gender. While
women dominate the informal sector jobs in Ghana, they are outnumbered by men
2:1 in the formal sector.
2.5 Experimental Results
Aggregate results reported in Table 2.2 show that given the choice of performing
the matching task for a piece rate or in a tournament with equivalent expected re-
turns, very few subjects, 30 percent, chose the competitive tournament compensation.
The tournament entry percentage is particularly low given our experimental set-up
whereby subjects compete against the previous round results and do not have to
compete against fellow subjects in real time. The low tournament entry percentages
provide a stark contrast to the several studies [Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, Gupta
et al., 2005, Gneezy et al., 2009] that show aggregate tournament entry levels are
closer to 50 percent, with some subgroups choosing to enter into the tournament at
rates that exceed one half.10 For Task 4, tournament entry was 21 percent, where
subjects chose whether to submit the Piece Rate performance of Task 1 to the tour-
nament. The higher tournament entry percentage in Task 3 relative to Task 4 may
reect subject optimism regarding future performance. In Task 3 the tournament
entry decision occurs before subjects perform the matching task and Task 4 entry
decision occurs after the score has already been determined.
The units in Table 2.2 are the number of correctly matched items to the cor-
responding numbered strips of paper that were distributed prior to each 60 second
10Niederle and Vesterlund [2007] nd 73 percent of men and 35 percent of women choose to enter
a similar tournament among US undergraduate subjects. Gneezy, Leonard and List nd 54 (26)
percent of women and 39 (50) percent of men in traditional matrilinial (patriarchal) societies.
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Table 2.2: Summary Data (In number of correctly matched items, unless otherwise
indicated)
Mean Minimum Maximum
Task 1 (T1): Piece Rate 7.75 0 14
(2.8)
Task 2 (T2): Tournament 9.57 2 16
(2.6)
Task 3 (T3): Choice Piece Rate or Tournament 29.7% Chose Tournament
Rural 25.0%
Urban 34.0%
Task 3 (T3): Piece Rate or Tournament Performance 9.45 3 18
(2.6)
Of those selecting Piece Rate 9.38 3 14
(2.5)
Of those selecting Tournament 9.60 5 18
(2.5)
Task 4 (T4): Choice Piece Rate or Tournament
Applied to T1 Performance 20.8% Chose Tournament
Rural 16.7%
Urban 24.5%
Subject Payment (Ghana cedis) 5.58 0.00 36.50
(7.6)
Average performance of 48 Rural and 53 Urban subjects. Standard deviation in parentheses.
Subject payment does not include the 5 cedi show-up fee.
round of play. Performance was bounded by the 21 item sequence. However, the time
limit of 60 seconds ensured that none of the subjects was able to correctly match
the full sequence. The average Piece Rate (T1) performance (7.8 correctly matched
items) was signicantly lower, than that of the following Tournament (T2) (9.6 cor-
rectly matched items) and Choice (T3) performance (9.4 correctly matched items),
with p<0.01 in a two sample t test.
Subject payments ranged from 0 cedis to 36.50 cedis and the average payout was
5.58 plus the 5 cedis show-up fee which was an amount that was well over 10 percent of
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average subject in our sample's monthly income. The maximum number of correctly
matched items in Tasks 1, 2 and 3 were 14, 16 and 18, which is important as all were
below the maximum 21 items in the numbered sequence.
The average Piece Rate performance in the urban group, 8.1, was higher than
the performance in the rural group, 7.4, though this dierence was not signicant (p
= 0.173, Mann-Whitney test). Similarly in the Tournament the urban group mean
score 10.0, was higher than the rural score of 9.1, though the test with p=0.077. The
dierence in average performance persisted through the nal round (p = 0.058), Task
3 with average for the urban subjects was 9.9 and for the rural subjects, 8.9. Because
the experimental design did not have any between site interaction and because our
results do not support within site dierences in performances based on gender, income
or ethnicity (hometown, languages), over the course of our analysis we have controlled
for the dierences in performance due to experimental location.
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Within subject performance from the rst to the second tasks was positive and
signicantly correlated as shown in Figure 2.3. Spearman rank correlations for Task
1 and Task 2 show a correlation 0.38 for both Rural and Urban experimental session
(p<0.01). As in similar experiments we observe an increase in performance from Task
1 to Task 2 (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007); the increase performance increase can be
attributed to learning, dierential responses to the compensation scheme or it could
be noise. The positive correlation between Task 1 and Task 2 in both Rural and
Urban groups is double for those entering the tournament than for those choosing the
piece rate pay in Task 3. Rural subjects who chose the tournament (piece rate) in
Task 3 had Task 1 and Task 2 Spearman rank correlation of 0.60, p = 0.041 (0.33, p
= 0.050). Urban subjects who chose the tournament (piece rate) in Task 3 had Task
1 and Task 2 Spearman rank correlation of 0.73, p < 0.01 (0.32, p = 0.062).
Table 2.3 reports subject performance in Tasks 1 and 2 by choice of Task 3 com-
pensation scheme and by urban and rural classication. While the tournament per-
formance did not vary by choice of Piece Rate or Tournament, in the aggregate we
found a large and signicant dierence in Piece Rate performance between those who
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Table 2.3: Performance in Task 1 and Task 2 by Choice of Piece Rate or Tournament
(Choice Round, Task 3)
Average Performance
Choice, Piece Rate Piece Rate (T1) Tournament (T2) Tournament
or Tournament - Piece Rate
Total Piece rate 7.46 9.62 2.15
(2.7) (2.7) (3.1)
Tournament 8.43 9.47 1.03
(3.1) (2.3) (2.3)
Rural Piece rate 7.33 9.31 1.97
(2.5) (2.3) (2.8)
Tournament 7.58 8.67 1.08
(2.6) (2.4) (2.4)
Urban Piece rate 7.60 9.94 2.34
(2.9) (3.3) (3.4)
Tournament 9.00 10.00 1.00
(3.3) (2.1) (2.4)
Number of correctly match objects.
Standard deviation in parentheses. 53 urban, 48 rural subjects.
chose Piece Rate and those who chose Tournament in the Choice round, though fur-
ther tests show this signicance is driven by the urban subjects. For those subjects
selecting Piece Rate in the rst Choice round (Task 3), the average score, 7.5, in the
Piece Rate Task 1 was lower than the average, 8.4, of those who selected the Tourna-
ment compensation in Task 3 (Mann-Whitney p = 0.077). This dierence was large
and signicant in the urban areas where those who selected the Piece Rate scored and
average of 7.6 in Task 1 and those selected the Tournament had an average score of
9.0 (p = 0.083). In rural areas there was no dierence (p = 0.631), where the average
for subjects choosing Piece Rate scored 7.3 compared to the average Task 1 score of
those who selected the Tournament of 7.6.
In the Tournament Task 2 in urban areas the average score was 10 with no dif-
ference in performance between those selecting Piece Rate or Tournament in the rst
Choice round (p = 0.69). The rural Tournament performance was 9.3 for subjects
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who selected the Piece Rate compared to 8.7 for those selecting the Tournament pay
though this dierence was not signicant (p = 0.36). We found that the variation in
Task 1 performance conditioned on Task 3 choice higher in the urban (1.4 higher for
those choosing Tournament in Task 3) subjects than in the rural (0.3 higher for those
choosing tournament in Task 3). However, both groups displayed identical average
change in performance (Task 2-Task 1) conditional on the choice of compensation
scheme (p = 0.91 Enter, p = 0.52 No entry). On average, those choosing Piece Rate
pay in Task 3 improved by two points from Task 1 to Task 2 and those choosing
Tournament pay improved by 1 on average.
Further examination of learning as measured by the absolute change in perfor-
mance from Task 1 to Task 2 (Figure 2.4) shows a large range from -5 to 10 and a
mode of 1 (0.22) with most of the competitors coming from this group. None of those
subjects with high positive improvements in score of 6 or greater chose to enter the
tournament in Task 3.
Table 2.4 shows that of the 30 people who chose to enter the tournament, 63
percent improved by 1 or fewer points from Task 1 to Task 2, though for both groups,
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Table 2.4: Composition of T3 Tournament Entrants by Change in Performance from
T1 to T2
Pooled Rural Urban
Performance T2 - Performance T1 > 1 0.37 0.33 0.39
Performance T2 - Performance T1 ≤ 1 0.63 0.67 0.61
Total Entrants 30 12 18
Among both urban and rural subjects, one half (0.5) had a value of T2 - T1 Performance ≤ 1
those with improvement of 1 or fewer was only half of the entire sample; that is, the
subjects who displayed the lowest absolute task learning as measured by the change
in score were more likely to compete in both rural and urban areas. This eect
was slightly more pronounced in rural areas where 67 percent of those choosing the
tournament cam from the bottom half of the learning Task 2-Task 1 distribution,
compared to 61 percent in urban areas.
Table 2.5 presents Self Rank conditional on actual performance in the Task 2
Tournament round so as to detect overcondence and any other patterns that relate
performance to beliefs. We report the Task 2 Tournament beliefs rather than the
Task 1 Piece Rate beliefs as we believe it to be a less noisy measure of actual beliefs.
We do not see aggregate overcondence that is characteristic in similar experiments
[Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007]. In the aggregate, of those individuals who scored
in the top quartile, 45 percent believed they were rst place, 50 percent for second
place and 5 percent, third. Subjects who scored in the second quartile managed to
accurately predict their position, with 61 percent correctly choosing second place for
the Self Rank. Though the apparent accuracy of the second place self-assessment
appears to be driven by a second place norm among all rural subjects and among
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Table 2.5: Self Rank and Tournament Performance by Quartile (In Percent)
Self Rank and Tournament Performance by Quartile
(In percent)
Quartile
Self Rank 1 2 3 4
1 45 14 30 23
2 50 61 35 37
3 5 25 22 27
4 0 0 13 13
Rural
Quartile
Self Rank 1 2 3 4
1 57 12 20 7
2 43 59 50 64
3 0 29 30 21
4 0 0 0 7
Urban
Quartile
Self Rank 1 2 3 4
1 38 18 38 38
2 54 64 23 13
3 8 18 15 31
4 0 0 23 19
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urban subjects who had scores that were above the median. The choice of second
place in the self ranking for the tournament was a focal point for the rural subjects: 43
(59, 50, 64) percent of the rst (second, third and fourth) quartile believed that they
were second place. Among the urban subjects, self rank conditional on performance
indicates higher condence overall than rural subjects, but this is driven by the low
performers. In the urban group, 38 percent of the subjects in the third and fourth
quartiles believed that they were rst place, compared to 20 and 7 percent in the
rural group. Among the top performing urban subjects , 54 (64) percent of the rst
(second) quartiles believed that they were second place.
Those who ranked themselves in rst place for Task 2 had the highest proportion
of tournament entrants in Task 3 for both rural and urban subjects (Figure 5a).
In Task 3, 44 percent of subjects who ranked themselves rst in Task 2 entered the
tournament. Though rural subjects were less likely to rank themselves rst than their
urban counterparts (Figure 5b). Under 20 percent of rural subject believed they were
rst place and nearly 60 percent believed they were second place as compared to a
more even distribution of the self rankings amongst the urban subjects.
In Task 4, only rural subjects who thought they had ranked in rst or second
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place chose to enter the tournament (Figure 6a). In this regard, the rural subjects
are showing consistency between beliefs and choices. 56 percent of rural subjects and
33 percent of urban subjects with a Self Rank of 1 chose to enter the tournament. As
in the Task 2 Self Rank, rural subjects chose second place more often than any other
ranking, albeit to a lesser extent (Figure 6b).
In the urban group we observed high proportion of entry in both Tasks 3 and 4
by subjects who ranked themselves last; these were low performing individuals with
a preference for tournament play. We did not observe this behavior among the rural
subjects.
There were no indications of aggregate subject overcondence from the beliefs
assessment tasks: for both the Piece Rate and the Tournament, most subjects believed
that they had performed second place or below (Table 2.6). Though urban and rural
subjects did have a signicantly dierent distribution of Self-Rank choices (Fisher's
exact test, p = 0.054) and urban subjects were 62 percent more likely to say that
they were best in the Tournament round.
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Table 2.6: Self Rank by Rural and Urban in Tournament (T2) and Piece Rate (T1)
(In Percent)
Task 2, Tournament Task 1, Piece Rate
Rural Urban Rural Urban
Best 1 19 34 19 28
2 56 36 40 25
3 23 19 35 34
Worst 4 2 11 6 13
Total 100 100 100 100
Figure 2.7: Proportion of Total Population Choosing Tournament in Task 3 (4) by





































Rural subjects believed they had performed in second place 40 percent of the time
for the Piece Rate task and 56 percent for the Tournament task. Positions 2 and 3
were the modes among the rural subjects, accounting for 75 percent of the guesses in
Task 1 and 79 percent in Task 2. Only 19 percent believed they ranked rst in either
task. The urban subjects, though more likely to choose the rst place 28 percent of
the time in Task 1 and 34 percent in Task 2, still had a mode for each task that was
second place or below. In Task 1, 34 percent of urban subjects believed they had
placed third and 36 percent believed they had placed second in Task 2.
Figure 2.7 shows the breakdown of aggregate tournament entry in Task 3 (4)
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Table 2.7: Probit of Tournament-Entry Decision: Dependent Variable Tournament
Entry (Treatment 3)
1 2 3
Rural -0.177 -0.166 -0.240
(0.007) (0.015) (0.004)






Marginal eects for Urban participant with T2-T1 of 2, Overcondence Index of 0 and T4 Entry.
P values in parentheses.
by Self Rank in Task 2 (1). Panel (a) illustrates the dierence in tournament entry
between rural and urban groups is primarily driven by subjects who ranked themselves
rst. Though we see in Figure (2.5a) the likelihood of entry conditional on Self Rank is
the same for rural and urban subject choosing rst place, relatively higher condence
of urban subjects (Figure 2.5b) leads to more tournament entry overall from the the
urban group. Though the proportion of subjects choosing to enter Task 3 tournament
conditional on a third or fourth place ranking was much higher among urban subjects,
the low overall proportion (25 percent rural, 30 percent urban) of subjects selecting
third and fourth lessened the aggregate eects of this dierence.
Panel (b) of Figure 2.7 shows that the dierence in tournament entry in Task 4
was driven almost exclusively by those who believed they were below the median.
This nding could indicate lower levels of risk aversion among subject who believed
they were low performing.
A probit analysis of the tournament entry decision in Task 3 (Table 2.7) shows
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the marginal eects of being rural, absolute change in performance, condence and
tournament entry in Task 4 for an urban subject with a change in score of 2, a
Condence Index value of 0 in Task 2 and who entered the tournament in Task
4.11 Regression 1 shows rural subjects were 17.7 percentage points (p < 0.01) less
likely to enter the tournament given their change in performance. The marginal
eects of the absolute change in performance, -0.044 (p < 0.01) show subjects were
less likely to enter the tournament the more they improved from Task 1 to Task 2.
When we include the Condence Index in Regression 2, we nd a positive marginal
eect of having more condence, but this result is not signicant (p = 0.21). The
lack of signicance on the condence term should not be surprising as even if a
subject is measured overcondent, unless he thinks he was rst place, entering the
tournament is not a rational choice. The high selection of 2nd and 3rd place by rural
and urban subjects is preventing the data for the self-rank measure from being a
determinant of tournament entry. The magnitude and signicance of the coecients
on the rural dummy and change in performance are essentially unchanged with the
addition of the condence variable. Regression 3 includes the decision to enter into
the tournament in the 4th round, which can be considered a measure of preferences
for competitive institutions isolated from preferences to actually compete. The Task
4 entry variable is positive and signicant (p < 0.01), and the marginal eects of the
11 The measure of condence reects the distance between guessed and actual rank, weighted
by their actual rank, (Actual Rank-Self Rank)/Actual Rank. This construction of the measure of
condence weights undercondence heavily, that is, where subjects guessed that they were in a lower
position than they actually were. The possible values ranged from -3 to 0.75, but for both Task 1 and
Task 2, the range was -2 to 0.75. Subjects were slightly less condent in their Task 1 performance
with average index value of -0.14 compared to the Task 2 average, -0.12, though this dierence was
not signicant (two-sample t-test, p = 0.878).
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Table 2.8: Probit Output, Decision to Submit the Piece Rate to Tournament, T4
1 2






Marginal eects for Urban participant with T1 performance of 10 and T1 Condence of 0.
P values in parentheses.
change in performance and Condence Index are unchanged. Controlling for general
tastes for competition, we nd that the marginal eects of being rural increase in
magnitude (p < 0.01).
Table 2.8 reports similar results in Task 4 where subjects were asked whether
they would like to submit their Task 1 score to tournament pay, rural subjects were
17.6 percentage points (p = 0.023) less likely to do so than their urban counterparts,
controlling for their performance in the rst round. Though strangely, the marginal
eects of performance are negative and signicant, meaning that those individuals
who scored higher were 1.7 percentage points (p < 0.01) less likely to enter the
tournament for each point of improvement in their Task 1 score. Controlling for
condence (Condence Index, Task 1) in Regression 2, we see that condence enters
positively, but not signicantly and the marginal eects of Rural Dummy and Task
1 are unchanged.
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Table 2.9: Ex Ante Monetary Costs of Over- and Under-Entry
Overentry Underentry Net Cost of Underentry
Total (Subjects) 21 28
(0.21) (0.28)
Expected Cost 94.0 181.8 87.8
Average expected cost 4.5 6.5 2.0
Rural 8 13
(0.17) (0.27)
Expected Cost 31.5 113.5 82.0
Average expected cost 3.9 8.7 4.8
Urban 13 15
(0.25) (0.28)
Expected Cost 62.5 68.4 5.9
Average expected cost 4.8 4.6 -0.3
Overentry was calculated based on T2 performance. If a subject's expected payo
given his T2 performance and the corresponding distribution of performance would
be higher under the T3 Piece Rate and the subject chose to enter, we considered this
Percentage of indicated group in parentheses.
In assessing the welfare implications of subject behavior in terms of experimental
payos, we present a basic analysis of over- and under-entry and the associated mon-
etary costs (Table 2.9). Over-entry was calculated based on Task 2 performance.12 If
a subject's expected payo given his Task 2 performance and the corresponding dis-
tribution of performance would be highest under the Task 3 piece rate compensation
and the subject chose to enter the tournament, we considered this over-entry. Simi-
larly, a subject who chose Task 3 piece rate compensation who would have received a
higher payo in expectation under the tournament pay was considered under-entry.
Costs of over- and under-entry were calculated as the dierence between the ex ante
expected value of the higher payo decision (that was not taken by the subject) and
12 We chose to base the designation of over- and under-entry at the distribution that was available
at the time the decision was made, that is, the Task 2 performance distribution. We do not consider
risk preferences, only monetary payos.
34
the payo given the actual choice. While both rural and urban had under-entry rates
of 0.3, over-entry was less common in rural groups, 0.17, compared to urban, 0.25.
The expected costs of under-entry were higher than the costs for over-entry in both
groups, though only signicantly so in the rural case where on average, net under-
entry (cost of under-entry-cost of over-entry) cost each subject 4.8 cedis, the show-up
fee. Urban subjects did not systematically over- or under-enter and the net cost of
under-entry was essentially zero.
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Our results indicate a general preference for a non-competitive compensation scheme
over a competitive of both urban and rural subjects in artefactual eld experiments.
However, urban subjects were around 20 percent more likely to enter into the tourna-
ment than were their rural counterparts. Our analysis points to ambiguity aversion
as the primary driver of the observed behavior and for the rural-urban dierence in
tournament entry. Though all subjects indicated diculty assessing relative ability in
new tasks, the urban subjects were overall more comfortable with uncertainty when
the potential rewards were high.
While the task in our experiment is simple and requires no special training or skill
to be successful, subjects appeared to feel pressure by the time constraint thereby
making what would otherwise be a trivially easy task dicult. In fact, no subject
was able to complete the task (correctly ll all 21 bins) and the highest score of 18
was earned by a single subject. The diculty of the task is a likely factor in the
observed low condence, which is consistent with the ndings that people tend to
believe they are performing better than average on easy tasks and worse on dicult
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ones [Moore and Small, 2007]. When we reduced the uncertainty in a set of pilot
experiments by announcing the score to beat to the rural subjects, participation on
the tournament doubled. This supports the hypothesis that ambiguity aversion over
risk aversion kept subjects from participating in the tournament in prior rounds.
Though the urban subjects did tend to perform better than the rural ones, because
we did not have and between group comparison, this should not have played any role
in the rural subjects willingness to select the tournament. However, we detected one
fundamental dierence between the two groups with regards to the Beliefs Assessment.
Irrespective of actual performance, rural subjects were most likely to guess that they
were in second place and we did not observe the same selection of second place for the
urban subjects. Conditional upon that belief of second place, there was no dierence
in tournament entry between urban and rural groups. However, urban subjects were
much more likely to think that they were rst place and thus entered more often.
Also, the urban subjects had a group of risk takers who thought they were in third
and fourth place and still chose to enter the tournament in the Choice rounds.
As the demographic characteristics of the subjects is otherwise identical between
the rural and urban, it makes our ndings that much more striking with implications
that support to a widely held view that rural people are less competitive than urban
people, even when controlling for a battery of demographic traits such as age, income
and gender. With the emergence of programs government run and civil society to
promote entrepreneurship in Ghana, it will be of critical importance for those design-
ing the programs to understand the cultural predispositions of the pool of potential
entrepreneurs and whether urban areas stand to receive a disproportionately higher
benet than rural areas due to systematic behavioral characteristics, such as stronger
preferences for competition amidst uncertainty.
While our study does not address urban-rural migration, using recent immigrant
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subjects, we can use a similar experimental design to test whether competitiveness of
rural immigrants is systematically dierent from those who do not choose to move to
the city. The out-migration of competitive individuals from rural areas has implica-
tions on the quantity and types of business activities that are locally developed and
sustained.
The strong signicant relationship between the change in score from the Piece
Rate to the Tournament rounds indicated that subjects were less likely to enter the
Tournament if they showed more improvement. If past performance was the subject's
primary input as he calculated the expected performance, then it would follow that
higher variance in the score would mean lower expected performance in relation to
the top score. The further the expected performance was from the top score, the less
likely a subject would assess themselves as being able to score in rst place and thus
enter the tournament. The uncertainty that each subject had regarding the top score
caused subjects to overweight the probability of scoring low in subsequent rounds.
With potential payos representing at least 10 percent of a month's wages for a
typical worker, nancial incentives were suciently high in both the Piece Rate and
Tournament compensation schemes to induce high levels of concentration and eort
in all tasks. However, our data are consistent with ndings in the literature that rank-
order tournament incentive schemes induce higher eort than piece rates [Lazear and
Rosen, 1981, Bull et al., 1987]. Preliminary ndings in a task where subjects learn the
top score (that must be exceeded) indicate that there is an interaction between not
only the choice to enter the tournament, which increased with increased information,
but with eort levels as well, which also increase.
In contrast to the related literature that evaluates preferences for competition
with heterogeneous group composition (men and women) [Gupta et al., 2005, Gneezy
et al., 2009, Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007], our experimental design consisted of
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homogeneous groups, similar to Carpenter and Seki [2005], which freed us from having
to consider any between group interactions that may have aected our measurement
of preferences.
Higher performing individuals were disproportionately less condent than their
lower performing counterparts, which helps to explain the overall low tournament
entry. The propensity of the high performing subjects to shy away from the high risk-
high return tournament compensation may reect the environment where scarcity
of good jobs implies a high opportunity cost of forgoing a good job to become an
entrepreneur. Higher performing individuals have more to lose from entering the
tournament and losing than do the low performing individuals. Trends in quartile
performance graph may reect this counter-intuitive trend that occurred with both
rural and urban subjects.
To fully capture the implications of our ndings on the potential for growth in
entrepreneurship in rural and urban areas, it will be important to compare the results
from these artefactual experiments with results from similar eld experiments with
local entrepreneurs. Though even without comparison, the subjects' display of a
strong lack of condence in an unfamiliar setting is likely an indicator of people's
adverse attitude toward seeking out opportunities when a safe option is available. If
the only entrepreneurs in the society are very small-scale and doing so out of necessity,
as opposed to those who have a relatively strong foundation from which to innovate
and create rms that improve economic eciency, governments may need to develop
mechanisms that provide adequate insurance to those skilled individuals in order to
induce them to take more business risks.
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Chapter 3
Do Taxpayers Use Charity Donations to Keep Auditors at Bay? Theory and
Experiment
3.1 Introduction
The use of signals to facilitate market exchange in games of asymmetric information
has strong intuitive and theoretical foundations in the well established literature be-
ginning with Michael Spence's [1973] seminal paper on job market signaling. With
broad applications of signaling games, the extent to which people use their available
signaling devices remains a rich area for experimental research; particularly, do peo-
ple utilize additional signals in a manner consistent with rational utility maximizing
behavior? We focus on two characteristics of real-life signaling situations that are rel-
atively under-explored in the experimental literature: rst, multiple, heterogeneously
reliable and partially correlated signals are oftentimes, at the disposal of the senders.
Whether to use a signal and if so, the choice among signals and welfare implications
are important decisions that warrant further study. Second, when neither a clear
pooling or separating equilibrium can be expected, a hybrid equilibrium necessitates
the use of mixed strategy by at least one of the types. We formulate a simple the-
oretical signaling model with multiple signals and a hybrid equilibrium in order to
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construct a corresponding two-sided signaling experiment that will test whether the
signaling strategies encompass the full set of available signaling options in a way that
the theory would lead us to expect.
The economics of tax evasion provides a germane application of a signaling model
in which we can develop a set of benchmark theoretical results to test experimen-
tally. The voluntary reporting of income is a naturally occurring signaling game that
takes place regularly between individual taxpayers and tax authorities. In the United
States, under-reporting of income by individuals constitutes 80 percent of the US tax
gap,1 which at 15% of the country's $2 trillion tax liability (2001), has signicant
nancial implications and continues to be a concern of tax authorities [IRS, 2009].
Because of many of the empirical challenges related to acquiring eld data from
illegal activity at the individual level, the theory has provided guidance regarding the
eects of institutional tax parameters on compliance. Natural experiments support
the theory as in Slemrod et al. [2001], but restrict the scope and timing of exploration.
Early theoretical work economics of tax compliance has approached the individual
tax evasion decision from the perspective of a rational utility maximizing taxpayer
who decides to misreport income dependent upon exogenous parameters such as tax
rate, probability of audit and size of punishment, in a framework akin to the early work
on crime and punishment [Becker, 1968]. In a series of papers by Graetz, Reinganum
and Wilde, the endogeneity of the audit policy was considered, along with taxpayer
behavior, both in a principal agent framework [Reinganum and Wilde, 1985] and as
a signaling model [Reinganum and Wilde, 1986, Graetz et al., 1986]. The recent
literature on tax compliance has taken a mechanism design approach to assess the
1Overstating deductions is another form of under-reporting income, as it eectively reduces the
amount of taxable income. However, the contribution to the tax gap is orders of magnitude smaller.
Since charitable donations typically constitute a small percentage of household budget and involve
two sided formal activity, it may be easy to see why overstating of these types of deduction,while a
problem, are not the main driver of the tax gap.
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optimality of tax policy [Bassetto and Phelan, 2008, Deneckere and Liang, 2010] and
the existence of the tax riot equilibrium. The existence of multiple equilibria in the
theory combined with scal motivation to understand the tax compliance decision
has provided a clear impetus for many tax experiments in their eorts to identify and
calibrate the incentives that determine individual compliance behavior.
Experiments on tax evasion, as in the initial theory, by and large, concentrate
on measuring the exogenous parameters that foster taxpayer compliance in the lab-
oratory and the associated comparative static results. They nd responsiveness to
tax rate, audit scheme, size of punishment, use of funds, uncertainty and social in-
teractions all factor in to the tax compliance decision [Alm et al., 1992a,b, Alm and
McKee, 2004, Hsu, 2006, Bernard Fortin and Villeval, 2007] Also typical of tax evasion
experiments, the single dimension of the decision, that is reporting of income. Several
recent experiments have introduced communication and social interaction treatments
to identify any eects on compliance [Bernard Fortin and Villeval, 2007, Alm et al.,
2009]. With few exceptions [Kim and Waller, 2005], tax experiments are single-sided
as opposed to strategic signaling games, focusing primarily on the parameters that
foster compliance and not the use of signals to avoid sanction.
The persistent tax gap notwithstanding, most people comply with tax rules. The
assumption that people fall into some continuum of types who are rational strate-
gic optimizers to those who follow all rules, irrespective of the optimal behavior, is
a characterization of reality that provides a tractable framework for understanding
a variety of behavioral regularities that are not easily explained by the standard
expected utility maximization. The tax compliance rate of 84% [IRS, 2009], in a
voluntary reporting system with relatively low probability of audit and punishment
size is supported by unreasonably high coecients of risk aversion [Bernasconi, 1998]
or the existence of honest people who follow the tax rules in way that does not reect
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any strategic calculations. The honest and strategic distinction was rst used in the
tax compliance context by Graetz et al. [1986] in their seminal theoretical work on
two-sided tax compliance and enforcement behavior .
We develop a simple tax evasion model as a signaling game between a taxpayer
and an auditor, with a non-strategic, always compliant type. In addition to the
taxpayer's income report to the auditor, we introduce a charitable donation option as
a costly signal, that directly aects only the taxpayer , but may serve as an indirect
signal to the auditor of the taxpayer's ethical type, which would have an impact on
an auditor's decision to audit.
According to the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey [2000], three quar-
ters of American households give to charity. While high income households account
for the majority of the charitable contributions, lower income households donate a
larger percentage of their incomes to charity. Charity's special tax status has lead
to many instances of fraudulent activity, including several prominent tax fraud cases
involving charitable donations. However, in all cases, charitable donations have been
used to avoid paying taxes. The use of charitable contributions to avoid audit is not
addressed by the IRS and similar to the other tax compliance parameters, is particu-
larly well suited to test in an experimental study as the limitations of collecting real
data are vast. Further, the choice of the charitable donation as the signal reects
a conjecture that there is some system of linked norms, in line the recent research
identity economics research [Akerlof and Kranton, 2000], in which we may expect
to nd a positive behavioral correlation at the individual level such that those who
donate to charity tend to truthfully report their income to the tax authorities. In
this scenario, a charitable donation can be considered not only a contribution to a
public good, but a signal that the individual making the donation is a good person
and behaves as good people are expected to.
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Under certain values of our theoretical parameters, we nd a semi-separating
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium where taxpayers will use the charitable donation to
signal honesty, thereby reducing the probability of audit. Auditors will optimally
audit reports without charity donations more frequently than those with donations.
To test our theoretical predictions, we use a two-sided signaling experiment of vol-
untary reporting of income for tax purposes and include an observable and veriable
charitable donation option. We introduce a computer generated compliant-type simi-
lar to Kim and Waller [2005] into the population in order induce a change in signaling
behavior of the experimental subjects, who we assume behave opportunistically. Our
aggregate experimental results indicate that senders (taxpayers) do indeed employ a
mixed strategy in-line with theoretical predictions, namely they use a charity dona-
tion in eort to prevent the receiver (auditor) from conducting an audit that would
result in a penalty in the case where the sender has misreported his type (income).
However, at the individual level, we nd less evidence of players behaving as the
theory predicts. Auditors respond to the charity donations as predicted by the the-
ory, though there is more noise in their decision making process. Individual analysis
indicates simple decision rules and past experience are driving subject behavior.
The following section provides a review of relevant experimental literature on
signaling and several of the voluntary reporting two-sided tax evasion studies. Section
3 presents a very simple model of tax reporting with honest taxpayers and the option
to make a tax deductible charitable donation. In Section 4 we present our hypotheses
regarding tax compliance and charitable donations implied by the theory and how we
will test them in the experimental laboratory. Section 5 is a presentation of our results
and Section 6 discusses the implication of the results in supporting our hypotheses.
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3.2 Experimental Background
With broad applications of signaling games and multiple theoretical equilibrium pre-
dictions, experiments provide a natural empirical methodology in which to establish
the conditions under which behavior conforms to the theory. Camerer and Weigelt
[1988] nd in an early signaling experiment nd that sequential equilibrium predic-
tions from the theory describe player behavior well, though players play as if they
have made idiosyncratic adjustments to prior beliefs. In another signicant experi-
ment, Brandts and Holt [1992] nd that though the sequential equilibrium is often
played, when players have experience with play o-the-equilibrium path, what they
call an unintuitive equilibrium arises.
The adverse selection problem inherent in a corporate nance has motivated sig-
naling experiments with similar goals of testing theoretical predictions regarding equi-
librium play [Cadsby et al., 1990, 1998, Forsythe et al., 1999]. Cadsby et al. [1990]
nd that a unique theoretical equilibrium predicts the experimental behavior well.
However, when separating and pooling and hybrid equilibria are predicted, only the
most ecient pooling equilibria emerge in the lab.
Since we employ a voluntary reporting system in our experiment, where taxpayer
incentives to announce the truth are limited, we can draw from the cheap talk and
signaling experiments for benchmark predictions[Gneezy, 2005]. A large experimental
literature addresses the use of cheap talk to arrive at ecient outcomes; cheap talk
has been shown to have real economic consequences, both in theory and experiments,
when the opposing players payos are aligned the sharing of information from the
cheap talk leads to eciency [Farrell and Rabin, 1996]. In the opposite case where
the incentives to lie are out-sized, outrageous claims will be ignored. It is the middle
case, which we use in our tax evasion set-up, where the incentives to lie are limited,
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making the experimental investigation of the equilibrium outcome most interesting.
Testing the use of multiple signals in an experiment, Duy and Feltovich [2006]
nd that combining the cheap talk signals with observation of past behavior to pro-
motes cooperation. However, they use simultaneous move games and only signals
to indicate future action, not type, as in the Bayesian sense of sequential games.
Charitable donations were used in laboratory experiments as a signal of type, namely
conditional cooperation [Max Albert and Maciejovsky, 2007], and did promote coor-
dination. However in our study, where the payos of the players are not aligned, the
signal is sent for purely self-interested motivations.
Forsythe et al. [1999] look at mutually exclusive communication mechanisms that
can overcome the adverse selection problem of nancial disclosure, like ours one of
the few studies that looks at signaling games where the opponents preferences are
in opposition. Introducing an anti-fraud provision that placed limits on the egre-
giousness of the claims that could be made on the part of the seller, did improve the
buyer's outcomes, where theoretically there should have been no dierence. Irrational
behavior money-burning is punished, in the sense that rms who waste money do
not get better treatment then those who do not.
Kim and Waller [2005] provide a direct test of the Graetz et al. [1986] model and
nd that in contrast with the theory in which they auditors do not respond to the
changing composition of strategic versus compliant types, in the experiment, auditors
incorrectly believe increases in strategic players increases under-reporting.
Experimental behavior in games with mixed strategy equilibria often is best mod-
eled not by the standard game theoretic equilibrium, but by adaptive learning mod-
els [Ochs, 1995, Erev and Roth, 1998]. Ochs [1995] nds that in competitive games,
steady states reached in the experiment dier considerably from Nash equilibrium
and that experimental subjects condition current actions on past experiences.
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3.3 Model
A simple model of voluntary reporting and tax compliance that draws from the crime
and punishment framework of Allingham and Sandmo [1972] and with honest tax-
payers from Graetz et al. [1986] is used to demonstrate how a charitable donation can
be used to signal type to an auditor who endogenously determines how frequently
to audit reports. Extension of the punishing of free riding, but certain free-riding
behavior, namely tax evasion, is illegal contribution is not voluntary per se; if the
government could freely monitor all income, taxes would be deducted according to
tax law, but due to budget constraints and voluntary reporting system that is subject
to strategic behavior on the part of taxpayers who are aware of the limited enforce-
ment capabilities of the tax authorities and respond accordingly. The auditor must
rely on reported income and a signal that is costly to the taxpayers, the charitable
donation, to inform his audit decision. Since we are focused on the signaling decision
rather than parameter testing in the tax compliance setting, we employ the simplest
formulation of a signaling model and introduce a signal that is correlated with one di-
mension of the sender's type. Compliant types do not optimally respond to incentives
and always truthfully report their incomes. We use the following discrete formulation
of the model to illuminate the decision to donate to charity as a signal of honesty,
not necessarily the degree, which we leave for further study.
The model is a standard signaling game where the sender is the taxpayer and
the receiver is the auditor. The equilibrium will take the form of Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, with strategy prole and beliefs prior beliefs regarding taxpayer type in
both dimensions posterior beliefs once the auditor receives the taxpayer signal.
Taxpayers in our model are characterized in two dimensions: opportunism, y,
which is a random variable and whose support is the set Y ∈ {c, s} where c identies
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the type that always complies with tax rules by truthfully reporting his income and
conforming to social norms regarding charitable giving, that is, within the context
of our model, unresponsive to any pecuniary incentives and s identies the strategic
type whose compliance decisions depend on a rational utility maximization problem
and; income, x, which is a also random variable whose support is the set X ∈ {H, L}
that is that is either high, H, or low L with H > L. We assume an individuals type
in each dimension is his private information and independent of the other dimension.
The distribution of types are independent and common knowledge: the proportion
of the population that is strategic is p ∈ [0, 1] and the remainder of the population,
1 − p, is comprised of compliant types. The proportion of high income taxpayers is
q ∈ [0, 1] and the proportion of low income taxpayers is 1 − q. The game tree is
depicted in Figure 3.1.
Taxpayers must pay taxes based on realized income, where TH is the tax payment
that corresponds to the high income draw and TL to low income. The tax burden is
always at most the level of income, H−TH ≥ 0, L−TL ≥ 0 and high taxes at least as
large as low taxes, TH ≥ TL. However, the tax payment is determined by voluntary
reporting to the auditor, so the taxpayer must make a reporting decision, R(x, y) ∈ X,
that will depend on his realizations of type and the tax payment, T (R), and will be
based on the auditor's current information regarding the taxpayer's income. If the
taxpayer reports high income, whether he is high income or not, then he will pay
T (H) = TH and similarly, if he is low income, he will pay T (L) = TL. In the even
that the taxpayer is audited and the auditor can update his information, he will pay
taxes on his true income, x.
Assumption 1. Compliant types always truthfully report their income, R(x, c) =
x.
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Figure 3.1: Tax Compliance Game with Charity Donation
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In the Graetz et al. model that had compliant types, there was no way for a tax-
payer to convey any information to the auditor regarding his type in this dimension.
In our framework, we introduce a charitable donation D ∈ {0, d}, d > 0 that can
serve as a costly signal, that is correlated with the compliant type. Otherwise, the
donation has no impact on the tax liability of the taxpayer.
Assumption 2. Compliant types always donate to charity, D(x, c) = d, irre-
spective of income.
This assumption is strong, but can be relaxed without changing the qualitative
nature of the results. Since compliant types do not respond to model parameters, we
could assume some fraction of these players donate to charity, which will aect the
equilibrium probability of donation for the strategic players.
The proportion of the population reporting low income and giving to charity is
(1− p)(1− q).
This follows from Assumptions 1 and 2.
If the taxpayer is discovered to be misreporting his income by an auditor, he must
pay a ne, F ∈ {0, f}, that will be positive f > 0 if he has misreported his income,
x 6= R, and 0 otherwise. There is no cost to that taxpayer if he is audited and
truthfully reporting his income.
All strategic taxpayers are risk neutral and have an expected utility, EU(R, D|x, s) =
x−D− [1−Prob(audit)]T (R)−Prob(audit)(T (x)+F (x, R)) that depends on signal
pair (R, D).
Also, min{H − TH , L − TL} > d, the all players would have net income greater
than zero after paying taxes and making the charitable donation and the penalty for
under-reporting is greater than the donation, f > d, so that we are not forced to
trivially eliminate the donation option for high income strategic individuals.
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Low income strategic types will never report high income. That is, R(L, s) = L .
For any probability of audit, b, that the low income strategic taxpayer with ex-
pected utility, EU(R, D|L, s) = L − D − (1 − b)T (R) + −b(TL + F (x, R)) chooses
a signal pair (R, D). If the taxpayer reports high income, then his utility will be
EU(R, D|L, s) = L − D − (1 − b)TH − b(TL − f) which is strictly less than his
expected utility if he reports truthfully, EU(R, D|L, s) = L−TL−D since TH ≥ TL.
Strategic types who report truthfully will never make a donation. That is, if
R(x, s) = x then D(x, s) = 0.
Since an audit has no eect on the payo of any honest report, it follows that for
any D > 0, the taxpayer's utility lower, therefore D = 0; rational optimizers have no
direct incentive to make a donation to charity.
Since low income strategic types will always play a pure strategy of low income and
no donation, (L, 0), only the high income strategic type may play a mixed strategy
where he chooses between the three possible signal pairs: (L, 0), (L, d) and (H, 0).
A mixed strategy for a high income strategic type is a probability distribution over
the possible signal pairs. The probability the taxpayer under-reports without making
a donation to charity, (L, 0), is α0 ≥ 0, the probability the taxpayer under-reports
and makes a donation to charity, (L, d) , is α1 ≥ 0 and the probability of submitting
a truthful report, (H, 0), to the auditor is (1− α0 − α1).
The taxpayer's signal pair, (R, D) is viewed by an auditor who must decide
whether to engage in an audit, A ∈ {0, 1}, that costs C to undertake.
The tax authority and auditor's objective is to maximize revenue net of audit
costs.
High reports are never audited as long as TH > TL + f − C.
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The audit revenue depends on the auditor's decision to audit and whether the
report from the taxpayer was truthful: Π (A|R) = T (R)+A(T (x)−T (R)+F (x,R)−
C). If A = 1, then if the report was truthful, R = H, results in net revenue Π (A|H) =
TH − C < TH , that is lower than in the no audit case. If the report was not truthful
and an audit was initiated then the net revenue Π (A|H) = TL + F − C < TH . The
focus of the auditor's eorts will be on identifying those taxpayers with a low report
who actually received a high income.
The auditor's beliefs, µ, regarding the taxpayer type given the signal pairs of low




qα0 + 1− q
pqα1
pqα1 + (1− p)(1− q)
i = 0, if D = 0
i = 1, if D = d
A low income report without a donation will either come from a strategic player
with high income who under-reports with probability pqα0 or a strategic low income
earner, p(1 − q). Because only strategic players refrain from donating, the audi-
tor's beliefs regarding the taxpayer type, (x, y), is independent of relative size of the
strategic population, p.
A mixed strategy for an auditor is a conditional probability distribution over the
possible signal pairs he could receive. The probability of audit given a low report
without a charity donation, (L, 0) is β0 and the probability of audit given a low
report with a charity donation, (L, d) is β1.
The auditor's maximization problem is conditional on the report of high or low
income and whether a donation was made. The trivial cases of a high income report
with and without donation will not induce an audit. The risk neutral auditor maxi-
51
mizes revenue net audit costs in the sequential game where the taxpayer is the rst
mover and has made a low income report:
Max
βi
Π (α0, α1, βi|D) = βi [µi (TH + f − C) + (1− µi) (TL − C)] + (1− βi)TL,
where i = 0 if D = 0 and i = 1 if D = d.
The cuto belief above which the auditor will always audit a report and below
which he will never audit is µ̄i =
C
TH + F − TL
, i = 0, 1.
The rst order condition will determine the auditor's cuto belief regarding the
proportion of misreporting in the population. He will be indierent between auditing
and not at the point where the net expected marginal return to an audit equals
the marginal cost. The probability of audit will be 1 whenever the proportion of
misreported incomes is above the cuto value and 0 if the proportion falls below:
β̂i =

1 if µ (αi) > µ̄i
[0, 1] if µ (αi) = µ̄i
0 if µ (αi) < µ̄i
for i = 0, 1.
The cuto value of misreported income, µ̄, depends on the cost, tax and penalty
parameters, so is not restricted to take on a value less than 1. Clearly, if µ̄ > 1, the
auditor will never audit.
The equilibrium strategy for strategic high income earner is characterized by the
following probabilities:
ᾱ∗i =
 ᾱi if 1 ≥ ᾱ0 + ᾱ1 ≥ 0ᾱi
ᾱ0 + ᾱ1
if ᾱ0 + ᾱ1 > 1
for i = 0, 1.
The cuto µ̄i determines ᾱi, i = 0, 1, from the auditor's beliefs regarding the
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∗
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q(TH + F − TL − C)
and ᾱ1 =
(1− p)(1− q)C
pq(TH + F − TL − C)
. In the case
that 1 ≥ ᾱ0 + ᾱ1 ≥ 0, the taxpayer's equilibrium strategy, ᾱi∗, is dened directly
by the parameters. In the case where ᾱ0 + ᾱ1 > 1, we assume that the taxpayer
will always misreport his income and will mix between donating and not donating
proportionally, such that ᾱ∗i =
ᾱi
ᾱ0 + ᾱ1
for i = 0, 1.




U (α0, α1, β0, β1) = H − α0[β0(TH + f) + (1− β0)TL] +
α1[β1(TH + f + d) + (1− β1)(TL + d)] +
(1− α0 − α1)TH
The equilibrium probabilities for audit are
β̄∗0 =
TH − TL
TH + f − TL
and β̄∗1 =
TH − TL − d
TH + f − TL
.
The ratio of the potential gain from misreporting to the downside loss from being
audited when misreporting, which is determined by the taxpayer's optimal choice
of α0 and α1. The rst order condition equates the marginal expected benet from
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misreporting, or the expected utility of a low income report to the marginal cost of
truthful reporting, which is the utility of a truthful report.
The cuto values determine the equilibrium strategy, β∗0 and β
∗
1 , for the auditor
who views a low income reports with and without donations:
α̂i(βi) =

1 if β < β̄∗i
[0, 1] if β = β̄∗i
0 if β > β̄∗i
i = 0, 1
In equilibrium, 1 > β̄0 ≥ β̄1 > 0, that is, the probability of audit for the low income
report with zero donations is higher than the low income report with a donation.
3.4 Experimental Design
To test our hypotheses regarding the use of signals in the tax compliance setting,
we ran laboratory sessions with University of Maryland undergraduate subjects in the
Experimental Economics Laboratory at the University of Maryland using University
of Zurich software, z-tree [Fischbacher, 2007]. Subjects were oered $5 as a show-up
fee and were told that they would earn $15 on average in a session that would last
approximately 60 minutes. We ran two treatments of the experiment and for each one
we conducted 5 sessions with 16 people for a total of 10 sessions with 160 subjects.
None of the subjects took part in more than 1 experimental session.
For our experimental sessions, we parameterized the theoretical model such that
high income players would have limited but positive incentives to cheat (Table 3.1).
Subjects were seated at private computer workstations where each one was ran-
domly assigned into one of two groups for the duration of the session: half of the
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Table 3.1: Experimental Parameters (in dollars)
High income H 20
Low income L 10
Proportion of high income taxpayers q 0.5
Proportion of strategic types, T1 p1 1.0
Proportion of strategic types, T2 p2 0.75
High tax liability TH 6
Low tax liability TL 0
Donation d 3
Fine f 6
Audit cost C 3
participants were in Group A (taxpayers), and the other half in Group B (auditors).
The instructions were distributed to each subject and then read aloud by the ex-
perimenter (See Appendix for experiment instructions). Though contextualizing in
signaling experiments can substitute for experience and can increase the initial level
of strategic play[Cooper and Kagel, 2003], since we were playing many rounds and
did not necessarily need the tax context for our results to be meaningful, we chose to
use abstract terminology to the extent possible over the course of our experiment; we
did not discuss tax or audit, but pay back and verication. All subjects were aware of
all of the roles and the parameters of the experiment and we required each subject to
correctly answer control questions regarding payos prior to the rst round of play.
Each round, a taxpayer and an auditor were paired at random to play the following
game: on his computer screen, a taxpayer received an income either $20 or $ 10 with
equal probability. The income draw was his private information and his decision
was whether to disclose $20 or $10 to the auditor given that a higher tax of $6 was
required if the income were $20 and the corresponding tax on the $10 income was
$0. The tax payment depended initially on the reported and not the actual income
and as in the model, the auditor collected all tax revenue from his corresponding
taxpayer partner. However, if upon viewing the report, the auditor decided to initiate
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Table 3.2: Taxpayer Payos
High Income
No Donation Audit Donation Audit
No Yes No Yes
Report High 14 14 Report High 11 11
Low 20 8 Low 17 5
Low Income
No Donation Audit Donation Audit
No Yes No Yes
Report High 4 4 Report High 1 1
Low 10 10 Low 7 7
an audit, he learned the actual income of the taxpayer and if it diered from the
reported amount, that taxpayer was required to pay a $6 ne in addition to the
unpaid tax liability (which could be negative in the case of over-reporting of income).
The taxpayer was also given the option to make an observable and veriable donation
to a University of Maryland charity,2 where the donation was immediately subtracted
from the income and had no impact on the tax liability of the taxpayer. We chose
this simplication rather than one that is closer to reality where charity donations
are essentially subsidized in the tax code, because donations still represent a loss to
the individual, with or without any added incentives.
The taxpayer's payos in all possible scenarios, Table 3.2, were given to all players
to ensure that the stakes of the game were clearly understood.
After viewing his partner's reported income and charity donation, the auditor was
given the option to verify the income report. An auditor incurred a cost of $3 if he
decided to verify his partner's income, but we provided each auditor with the $3 audit
cost in order to avoid any complications, both in terms of logistics and behavior, if
in fact we made participants take losses in the experiment. If the auditor chose not
2The charity selected was the University of Maryland's Maryland Fund for Excellence, the Uni-
versity's umbrella fundraising vehicle.
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Actual Income High 3 12
Low 3 0
to audit he kept the $3 in addition to any tax revenue corresponding to his partner's
report. If the auditor chose to verify his partner's income, he learned whether the
taxpayer's income was misreported or not. If the income was misreported, the auditor
earned the amount described above and if the report was truthful, the auditor would
earn nothing extra. The payos for the auditor in all possible scenarios are displayed
in Table 3.3, which was provided to all subjects, as was the case with the taxpayer
payo table. The taxpayer always learned whether he was audited or not and his
payo for the round. The subjects repeated the game for 20 rounds, each round with
a dierent anonymous partner.3
The preceding experimental procedure describes Treatment 1 for both the auditor
and taxpayer as well as Treatment 2 for the taxpayer. Treatment 1, as characterized
by our theoretical framework, has all taxpayers coming from the strategic-type as
opposed to the honest-type; p = 1. In Treatment 2, we introduced the honest-types
in the form of a computer generated report that is always truthful (Kim and Waller,
2005) and that always donates to charity. The proportion of honest-types is 0.25
or p = 0.75. As in Treatment 1, all of the parameter information was common
3For one session of Treatment, subjects played 17 instead of 20 rounds.
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knowledge.
For the auditor in Treatment 2, the procedure was the same as in Treatment 1
except we introduced a 25% chance that the report that an auditor would see was
computer generated. The income of the computer generated report was drawn from
the same distribution as the taxpayer's (50/50 chance of $20 or $10) and always
included a donation to charity. If the auditor saw the taxpayer's actual report, then
the game proceeded as in Treatment 1. If the auditor saw the computer generated
report and audited it, he would receive payos as if he had audited a truthful report.
If the auditor's corresponding taxpayer pair had misreported his income in that round,
the auditor would not discover this. The taxpayer only learned whether his report was
audited, not whether the auditor view his report or one that was computer generated.
Similarly, the auditor did not learn at any time whether the report he viewed was
from his taxpayer pair or computer generated, just whether his audit was successful
if he chose to do so. Finally, one round was selected at random for the entire session,
which determined payments and participants were free to leave.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Aggregate Results
We begin our presentation of the results with a comparison of the mixed strategy
component of the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, where high income taxpayers choose
whether to misreport their incomes and whether to donate to charity and auditors
choose which low income reports, with and without charity donations, to audit. We
then present an overview of behavior that we observed in the experiment but that o
the equilibrium path in our theoretical benchmark and provide possible explanations
for the discrepancy between the theory and the outcome in the laboratory.
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Table 3.4: Aggregate High Income Taxpayer Reported Income and Donation Rates
by Treatment
PBE Mixed Treatment 1 (p = 1) Treatment 2 (p = 0.75)
Strategy Report Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
If applicable (Income, Donation) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
α0 (10, 0) 0.33 0.28 0.33 0.33
(0.02) (0.02)
α1 (10, 3) 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.10
(0.01) (0.02)
1− α0 − α1 (20, 0) 0.67 0.62 0.56 0.51
(0.02) (0.03)
(20, 0) 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.06
(0.01) (0.01)
Any zero in the predicted column represents an o the equilibrium path prediction.
Table 3.4 presents the aggregate experimental results for taxpayer subjects with
the corresponding theoretical comparisons; Table 3.5 presents the same for auditor
subjects. The theoretical equilibrium predictions for taxpayer behavior are borne
out in the experimental data. For high income taxpayers, the rate of misreporting
without making a charity donation, α0 , in Treatments 1 (0.28) and 2 (0.33) are
not signicantly dierent from each other (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.20). Further, in
a one-sample t-test we cannot reject the hypothesis that the mean probability of
misreporting of high income in the no donation-case is the same as the theoretical
mean, 0.33 (p = 0.12). In the case where a high income taxpayer misreports his
income and donates to charity, the strategic variable, α1 , is signicantly dierent
between Treatments 1 (0.02) and 2 (0.10) (Mann-Whitney, p < 0.01), indicating that
in the aggregate, the signaling device was employed by the taxpayers strategically in
Treatment 2.
As to whether the theoretical predictions for α1 are supported by the experimental
data, in Treatment 2, in a one-sample t-test we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
mean probability of misreporting of high income in the donation-case is the same as
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Table 3.5: Aggregate Audit Rates Conditional on Viewed Income Report and Dona-
tion by Treatment
PBE Mixed Treatment 1 (p = 1) Treatment 2 (p = 0.75)
Strategy Viewed Report Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
If applicable (Income, Donation) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
β0 (10, 0) 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.56
(0.02) (0.03)
β1 (10, 3) 0 0.65 0.25 0.45
(0.11) (0.04)
(20, 0) 0 0.25 0 0.17
(0.03) (0.03)
(20,3) 0 0.36 0 0.14
(0.08) (0.03)
Any zero in the predicted column represents an o the equilibrium path prediction.
the theoretical mean, 0.11 (p = 0.54). However for α1, Treatment 1, in a one-sample
t-test we reject the hypothesis that the mean probability of misreporting of high
income in the donation-case is the same as the theoretical mean of zero (p = 0.01).
A possible accounting for this behavior could be social preferences.
We considered individuals who displayed a social preference to be those who do-
nated to charity even when they received a low income. In Treatment 1, 4.0% of
low income draws were accompanied by a donation and in Treatment 2, 4.5%. These
values were not signicantly dierent across treatments (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.719).
When we exclude any individual who has displayed a social preference, the result is
the same value for α1 of 0.02 which is signicantly dierent from zero (p = 0.01).
When we exclude Rounds 6-20 from our calculation of α0 we arrive at the theoretical
result for Treatment 1, α1 = 0, (t-test p = 0.158), indicating that though subjects
may had an initial inclination to donate to charity, as the game progressed, they were
converging to the equilibrium. Subsequent regression results will conrm this (Table
3.9).
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Aggregate auditor behavior (Table 3.5) is less in line with the theory, particularly
for the audit rates of a low income report with a donation. But we do nd, in contrast
with the experimental results of Kim and Waller 2005, the theoretical insensitivity
of β0 to p holds when we introduce the charity signal. Mann-Whitney test indicates
that the experimental β0's in Treatments 1 (0.53) and 2 (0.56) are not signicantly
dierent from each other (p = 0.36). Further, in a one-sample t-test, we can reject
the hypothesis that the mean probability of misreporting of high income in the no
donation-case is the same as the theoretical mean, 0.5 (p < 0.01); auditors are auditing
more frequently than the theory predicts. Mann-Whitney test indicates that the
experimental β1 in Treatments 1 (0.65, 20 observations) and 2 (0.45, 133 observations)
are signicantly dierent from each other at the 10 percent level (p = 0.10).
For both taxpayer and auditor participants, we observed o the equilibrium path
behavior in our model, such as donations when incomes were low, over-reporting of
income and auditing of high income reports. We can attribute it to subject confusion
only to a certain extent: the control questions administered at the beginning of the
experiment were meant to improve subject understanding of the payos. As shown
in Table 3.5, auditors were verifying high income reports at rates much higher than
zero: 25 percent (without donation) to 36 percent (with donation) in Treatment 1
and 17 percent (without donation) and 14 percent (with donation) in Treatment 2.
Even given that taxpayers were over-reporting their incomes, the best response of the
auditor would still be to refrain from auditing as he would lose $3 and only receive $6
in the event that a low income taxpayer was over-reporting as opposed to receiving
$9 for certain.
Table 3.6 shows that aggregate taxpayer behavior given low income is as the theory
predicts. However 3 percent in Treatment 1 and 4 percent of subjects in Treatment 2
give to charity when they have a low income. Also, 4 percent of subjects over report
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Table 3.6: Aggregate Low Income Taxpayer Reported Income and Donation Rates
by Treatment
Treatment 1 (p = 1) Treatment 2 (p = 0.75)
Report Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
(Income, Donation) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
(10, 0) 1 0.93 1 0.95
(0.01) (0.01)
(10, 3) 0 0.03 0 0.04
(0.01) (0.01)
(20, 0) 0 0.03 0 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
(20, 3) 0 0.01 0 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Any zero in the predicted column represents an o the equilibrium path prediction.
their income in Treatment 1 and only 1 percent do in Treatment 2.
The CDF of the high income under-reporting mixed strategies, α0 and α1 indicates
that mixed strategies were not concentrated at the prediction of 0.33 for α0 nor were
they at 0.11 for α1. Figure 3.2b clearly displays rst order stochastic dominance of
α1 in Treatment 2 over Treatment 1, though 70 percent of high income subjects never
employ the signal when they misreport their income in Treatment 2, though it is
still lower than the 85 percent who never donate when they are under-reporting in
Treatment 1.
With the computer generated subjects in Treatment 2, the appropriate test of
equilibrium behavior of taxpayer subjects involves using the eective audit rate, given
that auditors were only able to audit taxpayers 75 percent of the time. The actual
audit rates observed in the data are higher than the audit rates that were actually
faced by the taxpayer subjects during the experiment. Table 3.7 shows that the
auditors actual audit rates were signicantly higher than those audit rates faced by
the taxpayer. Taxpayers who reported a low income without a donation were audited
44 percent of the time as opposed to the auditors' actual audit rate of 56 percent.
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Table 3.7: Eective Treatment 2 Audit Rates Faced by Taxpayers Given Computer
Generated Reports
PBE Mixed Strategy Viewed Report Predicted Predicted Auditor Actual Faced by Taxpayer
(Income, Donation) (Linear Utility) (Log Utility) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
β0 (10, 0) 0.50 0.39 0.56 0.44
(0.03) (0.02)
β1 (10, 3) 0.25 0.36 0.45 0.33
(0.04) (0.06)




















Similarly, when making a low income report with a donation the audit rate faced by
taxpayers was lower than the actual audit rate, 33 percent instead of 45 percent. The
eective audit rates are consistent with the model prediction if the taxpayers are risk
averse with natural log utility.
The percentage of high income subjects who misreported their income (Figure
3.3) was between 0.1 and 0.5 in each round for Treatment 1 and between 0.2 and
0.6 for Treatment 2, which corresponds to the predicted dierence in misreporting by
treatment of 0.11 (0.44-0.33). Except for 3 rounds, Treatment 2 misreporting levels
were systematically higher than for Treatment 1.
64
Figure 3.4: Average Donation Percentage


















Of those subjects with high income who reported low income, the donation rates
are pictured in Figure 3.4. With the exceptions of rounds 4, 5, 7 and 19, the Treat-
ment 1 donation rates were zero, which is the theoretical prediction. Given the
experimental parameters, the theory predicts that high income subjects who misre-
port should donate to charity 25 percent of the time (α1/(α0 + α1)) = .11/.44 in
Treatment 2. Though in Treatment 2 we do not observe convergence by round to the
predicted donation rate, unlike Treatment 2, only 5 rounds had a zero donation rate
for the misreporting high income types. The last rounds were more likely to have
zero donation rates in Treatment 2, which could indicate that subjects were playing
an end-game, though the stranger design of the experiment should have prevented
this.
The CDF of individual audit rates for low income reports without donations in
Figure 3.5a shows little dierence in the audit rates, β0, between the treatments
as supported by our non-parametric tests and the theory. Also, the CDF shows a
broad range of mixed strategies being played as opposed to the 50 percent audit
rate prediction. For β1 the CDF (Figure 3.5b) shows that auditors were primarily
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playing pure strategies when they viewed a low income report with a donation, in
both treatments, auditing less in Treatment 2 than in Treatment 1.
Figure 3.6 shows the CDF's for Treatment 2 audit rates of low income reports
with and without donations. This graph shows whether the charity donation signal
lowered audit rates. Nearly 40 percent of the auditors who viewed a low report
with a donation never audited and auditors were much more likely to audit low
reports without donations for average subject audit rates from 0 to 0.5. For higher
average audit rates, from 0.5 to 1, we observed convergence between the audit rates
for low income reports with and without the charity donations. Individual analysis
suggests that certain auditor subjects over-audited in response to the positive feedback
generated from having caught a liar in previous rounds.
Audit rates of low income reports without donations did not vary widely by round
in either of the two treatments (Figure 3.7). Though the audit rate in the data did
exceed the prediction of 50 percent .
Audit rates both in the aggregate and by round for low income reports with do-
nations, were considerably higher in our experimental data than predicted theoretical
audit rate of 25 percent in Treatment 2. In Treatment 1, the theory predicted that
any low income reports with donations would be o the equilibrium path, therefore
auditor behavior in this sub-game was not predicted.
3.5.2 Behavior of Taxpayers
Though the aggregate behavior of taxpayers matches the Perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium predictions, individual decisions were subject to considerable noise, as indicated
by Table 3.8. Backward induction of the game eliminates several strategies from
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consideration in the theory, though in the experiment, the strategies are played with
positive probability.
Hypothesis: Taxpayers will not report high income when they received
low income.
Of the 40 taxpayer subjects in each of the treatments, in Treatment 1, 30 never
reported high income when their income was low and in Treatment 2, 38 never mis-
reported their low income. Of the subjects who did misreport, the average rate of
reporting high income when low was actually drawn was 0.18 for Treatment 1 and
0.16 for Treatment 2.
Beyond a preference for sharing, there is no incentive for subjects to violate this
hypothesis based on own payos. As a test for understanding of the game, it is clear
that most subjects understood the game as far as what the best move was in the case
where the income draw was low.
Hypothesis: Taxpayers who report truthfully will never donate to charity.
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Of the low income earners who always reported low income 7 in Treatment 1 and 9
in Treatment 2 donated to charity. As for the truthful reports of high income, 26
subjects in Treatment 1 and 30 subjects in Treatment 2 never made donations. Of
those subjects who reported low income when their income was low and never gave
to charity when truthfully reporting, 4 in Treatment 1 and 7 in Treatment 2 used the
charity donation as a signal.
Hypothesis: Taxpayers will misreport their income when it is high while
donating to charity only when some of the players are honest-types,
p < 1.
Signaling behavior was observed in both treatments, in a manner that is in line with
the predictions, namely that more signaling behavior will be observed in Treatment 2
than in Treatment 1. In Treatment 1, 6 subjects used the signal and in Treatment 2,
13 did. When we identify which of those subjects do not display any preferences for
make a donation when their income is high, the number of subjects using the signal
drops in each treatment, to 5 in Treatment 1 and 8 in Treatment 2.
As for those subjects who made consistent reports, in Treatment 1, 9 always
reported truthfully when earning high income and in Treatment 2, 5 subjects never
lied on high income draws. On the other side of the spectrum, only 1 subject in
Treatment 1 always reported low income when earning high income and 2 subjects
in Treatment 2. Finally, very few subjects donated when truthfully reporting high
income and did not donate when lying about their high income; 5 in Treatment 1 and
2 in Treatment 2.
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Figure 3.9: Individual Taxpayer Behavior, Treatment 1 (A), Treatment 2 (B)
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Table 3.8: Summary of Individual Taxpayer Decisions (number of subjects)
T1 T2
Low income: never report High income 30 38
Of which make Donation 7 9
Low income: always report Low income, never make Donation 23 29
Of which never make Donation when truthfully report High income 18 24
Of which use Signal, High income: report Low income, make Donation 4 7
High income: never report Low income 9 5
High income: always report Low income 1 2
High income: if report High income, never make Donation 26 30
High income: if report Low income, make donation 6 13
Of which never make Donation when report High income 5 8
High income: make Donation when report High,
never make Donation when report Low 5 2
A sample of individual taxpayer behavior in Treatments 1 and 2 presented in
Figure 3.9 indicates that few patterns can be established across taxpayers. We found
no eect of the sanctions in prior rounds on current period behavior. The coecients
on a misreporting dummy, which takes a value 1 if truthfully reporting and 0 if not,
on previous round audits, in the preceding period up to any of the 5 preceding periods
were insignicant in probit regressions.
The probit analysis in Table 3.9 regresses the donation decision on a mis-reporting
income dummy that takes a value of one if a subject lied in his report and 0 otherwise,
income, which could be either 10 or 20, the round of play and a dummy variable that
takes a value of 1 if the subject was audited in the previous period. The results show
that income made subjects more likely to donate to charity by 7 percent (p = 0.02) in
Treatment 1 and 16 percent (p < 0.01) in Treatment 2. 4 In Treatment 1, if a subject
4The coecients in the probit table represent marginal eects at Income=20, Misreport=1,
Round=10 and Previous audit=1. Because each variable takes on only two values, the percent-
ages are obtained by multiplying the coecients by the dierence in the high and low values of the
variables. For income, the factor is 10.
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Table 3.9: Determinants of Taxpayer Donation, Probit Analysis by Treatment
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
(p-value)
1 2 3 4
Misreport -0.031 -0.027 0.086 0.101
(0.343) (0.352) (0.018) (0.010)
Income 0.008 0.007 0.014 0.016
(0.018) (0.016) (0.002) (0.001)
Round -0.004 -0.004 -0.009 -0.010
(0.081) (0.078) (0.013) (0.012)
Audited in 0.018 -0.056
previous period (0.397) (0.169)
N 760 760 736 736
Marginal Eects at Income=20, Misreport=1, Round=10 and Audit=1.
misreported his income, he was less likely to make a donation, though this coecient
is not signicant (p = 0.34). However in Treatment 2, the subject's misreporting
factored signicantly into the probability of donation: subjects were 10% (p = 0.01)
more likely to donate if they were lying (Regression 4). Similar to our observation and
statistical analysis regarding the eect of previous round audits on lying behavior,
we found that previous round audits have no impact on donation behavior in either
treatment (Regressions 1 and 3).
3.5.3 Behavior of Auditors
Hypothesis: Auditors will not audit taxpayers who report high income.
Table 3.10 presents a summary of individual auditing behavior as well as average
audit rates conditional upon which signal was viewed by the auditor. The average
audit rates were all greater than zero for high income reports in both treatments. Out
of 40 auditor subjects in Treatment 1, only 16 subjects never audited high income
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reports without donations and 13 never audited high income reports with donations.
In Treatment 2, subject behavior was closer to the equilibrium prediction with 29
subjects who never audited a high income report without a donation and 25 subjects
never audited a high income report with a donation. Consistent with the payo struc-
ture, low income reports were audited more than high income reports and reports.
Hypothesis: Auditors will audit low reports without charity donations
with higher probability than those with charity donations.
In each of the treatments, over 50 percent of the auditors never audited a low report
with a donation and 8 percent always audited those reports. In the aggregate we
nd no signicant dierence between the audit rates of low reports with and without
a donation in either treatment. However, at the individual level there are more
pure strategies being played by the auditor subjects when a low income report is
accompanied by a donation. In Treatment 1, 3 subjects always audited low income
reports with donations and 3 subjects never do. The other 34 auditors played mixed
strategies. In Treatment 2, 28 of the 40 subjects played mixed strategies when no
donation is observed. When the taxpayer does make a donation and report a low
income, only 24 auditors played mixed strategies in Treatment 1 and fewer, 19, in
Treatment 2.
The probit analysis in Table 3.11 of the auditor decision based on the viewed
income report, donation and a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the auditor
detected a liar in the previous period indicates that the auditor was 39 percent more
likely to initiate an audit for low income reports in Treatment 1 and 24 percent
more likely in Treatment 2, both signicant at the 1 percent level. For reports with
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Table 3.10: Summary of Individual Auditor Decisions
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Low income, no Donation: Signal (10, 0)
Audit Rate 0.52 0.59
Standard Error 0.01 0.02
# of Subjects who Always audit 3 10
# of Subjects who Never audit 3 2
Low income, Donation: Signal (10, 3)
Audit Rate 0.64 0.53
Standard Deviation 0.11 0.04
# of Subjects who Always audit 11 11
# of Subjects who Never audit 6 10
High income, no Donation: Signal (20, 0)
Audit Rate 0.25 0.14
Standard Deviation 0.02 0.02
# of Subjects who Always audit 1 2
# of Subjects who Never audit 16 29
High income, Donation: Signal (20, 3), Observations
Audit Rate 0.36 0.20
Standard Deviation 0.07 0.04
# of Subjects who Always audit 7 5
# of Subjects who Never audit 13 25
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Table 3.11: Probit: Independent Variable Audit (Marginal Eects)
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
(p-value)




Caught a liar 0.086 0.176
previous round (0.109) (0.006)
N 760 736
Marginal Eects at Income=10, Donation=3 and Caught Liar=1.
a donation in Treatment 1, the coecient on donation of 0.037 represents an 11
percent increase in the probability of audit if a donation is viewed by the auditor.
5 The model predictions place zero probability on any donations being made if all
types are strategic. The positive and signicant coecient on donations in Treatment
1 one indicates that the charity donation may have been interpreted as a signal of
non-compliance without our prompting of the subjects in the opposite direction, as
we do in Treatment 2. As we see in Treatment 2, an auditor who viewed a charity
donation was 8 percent less likely to audit the report than if no donation had been
made. When we impose the computer generated subjects with 25 percent chance on
the auditor in Treatment 2, making it was less likely to catch a misreporting taxpayer
subject, the auditors response to catching a liar in the previous period becomes highly
signicant in determining whether he audits in the current period he was more likely
to audit: 9 percent more likely in Treatment 1 (p = 0.11) and 18 percent more likely
in Treatment 2 (p = 0.01). The signicant response to past experience in our result
suggests an adaptive learning process is inuencing the auditor's equilibrium strategy.
5The coecients in the probit table represent marginal eects at Report=10 and Donation=3.
Because each variable takes on only two values, the percentages are obtained by multiplying the
coecients by the dierence in the high and low values of the variables. For income, the factor is
10 and for the donation, the factor is 3.
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3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Though the aggregate likelihood of the use of a charity donation as signal of
honesty by taxpayers conforms with the numerical theoretical predictions, our results
indicate that at the individual level, the response to the change in composition of the
population when we introduced the compliant types was heterogeneous across subjects
and there was little indication that all subjects would converge to the equilibrium
strategy in additional rounds. In identify individual strategies across treatments and
in a binary choice model analysis of taxpayer behavior we found that on the margin,
there were more subjects who used the donation as a signal of honesty when the
proportion of compliant types in the population increased, p = 0.75. However, in the
treatment with compliant types the use of the signal by taxpayer subjects did not
increase for 27 out of 40 subjects when the theory would have predicted increased
probability of donation when under-reporting income for all subjects.
Auditor behavior in the experiment generally consistent with the Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium probabilities whether a low income report was or was not accompanied
by a donation; auditors audited low income reports without donations at higher rates
than they did low income reports with donations. However, we identied subjects who
consistently over-audited low income reports (more than 50 percent of the time) which
drove aggregate audit rates higher than predicted. Also, audits were systematically
initiated o the equilibrium path. We explain this by showing that auditors were
responding to feedback after having caught dishonest taxpayers in previous rounds.
Even with the higher audit rates played by auditor subjects in Treatment 2, taxpayers
faced audit rates that were in line with equilibrium predictions because of the lower
chance of audit with the computer generated reports. In this regard, the aggregate
taxpayer behavior is fully in line with the equilibrium predictions.
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One aspect of the experimental assumption that all subjects will behave as if they
are strategic types on the taxpayer side is called into question by our results. In
each of the treatments, there were a signicant number of subjects, 23 percent in
Treatment 1 and 13 percent in Treatment 2, who never misreported their incomes.
Though high risk aversion of could be used to explain this, it is still an indication
that individual level heterogeneity had a signicant impact on whether the donation
was used as a signal.
The random matching of subjects ensured that we did not have generate reputa-
tion concerns, but an adaptive learning process was most likely at work. In the case of
the auditors, we nd evidence from our regression analysis (Table 3.8) that auditors
were generally more inclined to audit low income reports without donations, as the
theory suggests, but a strong and signicant predictor of audit was whether an auditor
has caught a taxpayer who was misreporting his income in a previous round. Similar
to studies that support the adaptive learning model to predict subject behavior in
games with mixed strategy equilibria using repeated play in a simultaneous move
games [Ochs, 1995, Erev and Roth, 1998], our results indicate that auditors in our
sequential move game made decisions based on very basic feedback from the previous
round. The static theoretical framework that we used to set our benchmark predic-
tions did not consider this motive for auditing and the feedback may have explained
why we observed audit rates that were higher than our predictions.
In addition to nding that players in our experiment do increase donations in
response to a change in the composition of the population of strategic and compli-
ant types, that the increased donations are accompanied by increased misreporting
rates of income in a manner that is consistent with the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Though we did observe that people may have wanted to give to the charity, absent an
strategic considerations, our analysis suggests that we can expect subject donations
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to converge to the theoretical prediction of zero whenever subjects are truthfully re-
porting their income. Combined with the signicant increase in charity donations
when we introduced compliant types, we have demonstrated a purely rational motive
for charitable giving; of the many explanations for charitable donations[Androeni,
1990, Androeni and Petrie, 2004], and more generally, contributions to public goods
[Fehr and Gaechter, 2000], few papers consider what might appear to be pro-social
behavior in the way we have, as a signaling device that can be used to divert the
attention of authorities from punishable behavior.
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Chapter A
Preferences for Competition in Ghana: Experiment
Instructions
Experiment Script: We are part of a research team from University of Maryland
from the Economics and we have come to (Town) to study various aspects of doing
business in Africa. We have asked you here to participate in some of our tests that are
essentially very simple games. To make the playing of these games worth your time
and eort, we will pay each participant 5 cedis for participating plus any winnings
based on how well you do in the games. On average, you should take home 10 cedis.
All information will be kept secret and only the researchers will have access to it.
Your decision to play or not play will have absolutely no impact on your current
employment and all data we collect will not include your name. If you decide not
to participate in this study or if you stop participating at any time, you will not be
penalized or lose any benets to which you otherwise qualify.
Participation in this experiment involves: lling out a brief questionnaire which
we will provide to you that asks your hometown, age, level of education, number of
languages spoken, job title and description, time at current position and other jobs
or business activities; playing a matching game; and answering some questions. This
session should last no longer than 90 minutes.
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You will sit and your desk and we will provide you with a basket containing many
coins, coee beans, paper clips, pebbles, beans and okra. Next we will show you a
picture and you will have one minute to place the items from your basket in the exact
order of the picture. (Participants will play a practice round.) You will play the game
four times and we will give you specic instructions for how you will be paid at the
beginning of each round.
Game 1: You will be paid 50 peswas for each correctly ordered object.
Game 2: Now we are dividing the players into groups of 4. You will not know who
is in your group, but you will know that it is someone in this room. The person in
each group who places the most correct objects in order will receive 2 cedis per item,
the others will receive nothing.
Game 3: You may now choose whether you would like to be paid 50 peswas per
item, as you were paid in Game 1, or you can play as you did in Game 2, where you
receive 2 cedis per item only if you win. If you choose Game 2 format, you will not
play against each other; you will play against the scores in Game 2. It is possible for
all of you to win if you do better than the winner in your small group last round.
You can all lose, too.
Game 4: Would like to be paid a piece rate or tournament wage for Treatment
1 performance? This choice will not aect your payment from the rst game, this is
just like a 4th game that you will not play.
Follow-up questions: Would you like to be paid for Game 1 per item or using the
tournament scheme? How well do you think you did in Game 2 (rank: 1st, 2nd, 3rd
or 4th)?
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Table A.1: Subject Datasheet
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Chapter B
Tax Evasion and Charity: Experiment Instructions
B.1 Treatment 1 Instructions
This is an experiment in decision making. Research foundations have provided funds
for conducting this research. Your earnings will depend partly on your decisions
and the decisions of the other participants and partly on chance. Please pay careful
attention to the instructions as a considerable amount of money is at stake.
The entire experiment should be complete within an hour. At the end of the
experiment you will be paid privately. At this time, you will receive $5 as a partici-
pation fee (simply for showing up on time). Details of how you will make decisions
and receive payments will be provided below.
A Decision Problem: In this experiment, you will participate in 20 independent
decision problems that share a common form. This section describes in detail the
process that will be repeated in all decision problems.
Before the beginning of the experiment, each participant will be randomly assigned
into two groups. Half of the participants will be in Group A, and half of the
participants will be inGroup B. Your assigned group will stay the same throughout
the end of the experiment. At each of the 20 rounds, one participant from Group A
will be randomly matched with one participant from Group B.
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If you are assigned to Group A: Each round, you will have an equal chance of
receiving an either $20 or $10. The amount you received is your private information
and known only by you. You must decide whether to disclose $20 or $10. You must
pay a portion of the money you receive back to the experimenter, which will be paid to
your Group B counterpart, depending on which amount you received: if you received
$20, you must pay back $6; if you received $10, you do not have to pay back the
experimenter. The amount immediately deducted from your account will be based
on the amount you disclose. You may disclose any amount, but if you are selected
for verication, you will be subject to a penalty if your disclosure does not match
the actual amount you received. You will also have the option to donate $3 from
the money you have received to the Maryland Fund for Excellence. If you choose to
donate to charity, your donation will be subtracted from the money you have received
and will have no impact on the amount you must pay back to the experimenter.
Verication
Each round, you will be paired with a dierent participant at random from Group
B who may choose to verify your reported income. If your income report is chosen
for verication and you have misreported your income, you will pay the experimenter
the amount required based on your actual income plus a penalty of $6.
Below you can nd your payos under each possible scenario,
At the end of each round, you will learn whether your partner decided to verify
your income or not.
If you are assigned to Group B: Each round, you will be paired with a dierent
participant at random from Group A. You will learn his/her reported income and
his/her actual charity donation to the Maryland Fund for Excellence. His/her re-
ported income will determine how much he/she pays to the experimenter, which will
be in turn given to you. After learning this information, you will be asked whether
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Table B.1: PAYOFF TABLES, Group A
$20
Income: 20 Verication Income: 20 Verication
No Donation No Yes Donation No Yes
Report 20 14 14 Report 20 11 11
10 20 8 10 17 5
$10
Income: 10 Verication Income: 10 Verication
No Donation No Yes Donation No Yes
Report 20 4 4 Report 20 1 1
10 10 10 10 7 7
Table B.2: PAYOFF TABLES, Group B
$20 Report Verication
No Yes





Actual 20 3 12
10 3 0
you like to verify his/her income. You will be given $3 that you may use to initiate
a verication. If you initiate the verication of your counterpart in Group A, you
will incur a cost of $3. If you choose to verify your partner's income, you will learn
whether he/she misreported or not. If the income was misreported, you will earn the
$6 ne plus the dierence in tax revenue due to the misreporting. If your partner
reported his/her income correctly, then you will not earn any additional amount. If
you do not initiate a verication, you will keep the $3.
Below you can nd your payos under each possible scenario,
Earnings At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select one
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decision round. Each round is equally likely to be selected.
Rules: All information will be kept secret and only the researchers will have access
to it. Your decision to play or not play will have absolutely no impact on your course
grades or employment and all data we collect will be anonymous. If you decide not
to participate in this study or if you stop participating at any time, you will not be
penalized or lose any benets to which you otherwise qualify. Please do not talk with
anyone during the experiment. We ask everyone to remain silent until the end of the
last round. If there are no further questions, you are ready to start.
B.2 Treatment 2 Instructions
This is an experiment in decision making. Research foundations have provided funds
for conducting this research. Your earnings will depend partly on your decisions
and the decisions of the other participants and partly on chance. Please pay careful
attention to the instructions as a considerable amount of money is at stake.
The entire experiment should be completed within an hour. At the end of the
experiment you will be paid privately. At this time, you will receive $5 as a partici-
pation fee (simply for showing up on time). Details of how you will make decisions
and receive payments will be provided below.
A Decision Problem: In this experiment, you will participate in 20 independent
decision problems that share a common form. This section describes in detail the
process that will be repeated in all decision problems.
Before the beginning of the experiment, each participant will be randomly assigned
into two groups. Half of the participants will be in Group A, and half of the
participants will be in Group B. Your assigned group will stay the same throughout
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the end of the experiment. At each of the 20 rounds, one participant from Group A
will be randomly matched with one participant from Group B.
If you are assigned to Group A: Each round, you will have an equal chance of
receiving an either $20 or $ 10. The amount you received is your private information
and known only by you. You must decide whether to disclose $20 or $10. You must
pay a portion of the money you receive back to the experimenter, which will be
paid to your Group B counterpart, depending on which amount you received: if you
received $20, you must pay back $6; if you received $10, you are not required to pay
anything back. The amount immediately deducted from your account will be based
on the amount you disclose. You may disclose any amount, but if you are selected for
verication by your counterpart, you will be subject to a penalty if your disclosure
does not match the actual amount you received. You will also have the option to
donate $3 from the money you have received to the Maryland Fund for Excellence.
If you choose to donate to charity, your donation will be subtracted from the money
you have received and will have no impact on the amount you must pay back to the
experimenter.
Verication
Each round, you will be paired with a dierent participant at random from Group
B who may choose to verify your reported income. However, there is a chance that
your counterpart in Group B will NOT see your report instead he/she will see a
computer-generated report. There is an equal chance that the income from the
computer-generated report is $20 or $10 and the computer-generated report will al-
ways include a charity donation. With probability ¾ (75% chance) he/she will see your
report and with probability ¼ (25% chance) he/she will see the computer-generated re-
port. If your counterpart sees your reported income and charity donation and chooses
to verify it, then if you have misreported your income, you will pay the experimenter
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Table B.3: PAYOFF TABLES, Group A
$20
Income: 20 Verication Income: 20 Verication
No Donation No Yes Donation No Yes
Report 20 14 14 Report 20 11 11
10 20 8 10 17 5
$10
Income: 10 Verication Income: 10 Verication
No Donation No Yes Donation No Yes
Report 20 4 4 Report 20 1 1
10 10 10 10 7 7
the amount required based on your actual income plus a penalty of $6. If your report
is truthful, or if your counterpart sees the computer-generated report then you will
not pay anything extra. Below you can nd your payos under each possible scenario;
verication Yes means that your counterpart sees your report and chooses to verify
it; verication No means that either your counterpart sees your report but does not
choose to verify it or he/she has sees the computer-generated report:
At the end of each round, you will only learn whether your report has been veried
or not. You will not learn whether your Group B counterpart saw your report or the
computer-generated report.
If you are assigned to Group B: Each round, you will be paired with a dierent
participant at random from Group A. You will see a report that shows a report of
income and charity a donation. There is a 75% chance that what you see is the
income report from your counterpart in Group A and his/her actual donation to
charity. However, there is a 25% chance that the income report and charity donation
you see are computer generated. There is an equal chance that the income from
the computer-generated report is $20 or $10 and the computer-generated report will
always include a charity donation. After viewing the report on your screen, you will
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Table B.4: PAYOFF TABLES, Group B
$20 Report Computer Generated
Verication Verication
No Yes No Yes
Actual 20 9 6 9 6
10 9 6 NA NA
$10 Report Computer Generated
Verication Verication
No Yes No Yes
Actual 20 3 12 NA NA
10 3 0 3 0
be asked whether you would like to verify the income report. You will be given $3
that you may use to initiate a verication. If you initiate the verication of your
counterpart in group A, you will incur a cost of $3. If you choose to verify your
partner's income, you will learn whether he/she misreported or not. If the income
was misreported, you will earn the $6 ne plus the dierence in tax revenue due to
the misreporting. If your partner reported his/her income correctly or the report you
chose to verify is a computer generated report, then you will not earn any additional
amount. If you do not initiate a verication, you will keep the $3.
Below you can nd your payos under each possible scenario when the report you
saw was submitted by your counterpart or was computer-generated:
Earnings At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select one
decision round do determine your payment. Each round is equally likely to be selected.
Rules: All information will be kept secret and only the researchers will have access
to it. Your decision to play or not play will have absolutely no impact on your course
grades or employment and all data we collect will be anonymous. If you decide not
to participate in this study or if you stop participating at any time, you will not be
penalized or lose any benets to which you otherwise qualify. Please do not talk with
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anyone during the experiment. We ask everyone to remain silent until the end of the
last round. If there are no further questions, you are ready to start.
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